Buffalo Hunt: International Trade and the Virtual Extinction of the North American Bison by M. Scott Taylor
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
BUFFALO HUNT: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE VIRTUAL EXTINCTION








I am grateful to seminar participants at the University of British Columbia, the University of Calgary,
the Environmental Economics workshop at the NBER Summer Institute 2006, the fall 2006 meetings
of the NBER ITI group, and participants at the SURED II conference in Ascona Switzerland.  Thanks
also to Chris Auld, Ed Barbier, John Boyce, Ann Carlos, Charlie Kolstad, Herb Emery, Mukesh Eswaran,
Francisco Gonzalez, Keith Head, Frank Lewis, Mike McKee, and Sjak Smulders for comments; to
Michael Ferrantino for access to the International Trade Commission's library; and to Margarita Gres,
Amanda McKee, Jeffrey Swartz, Judy Hasse of Buffalo Horn Ranch and Andy Strangeman of Investra
Ltd. for research assistance.  Funding for this research was provided by the SSHRC. The views expressed
herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
© 2007 by M. Scott Taylor. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Buffalo Hunt: International Trade and the Virtual Extinction of the North American Bison
M. Scott Taylor




In the 16th century, North America contained 25-30 million buffalo; by the late 19th century less than
100 remained.  While removing the buffalo east of the Mississippi took settlers over 100 years, the
remaining 10 to 15 million buffalo on the Great Plains were killed in a punctuated slaughter in a little
more than 10 years.  I employ theory, data from international trade statistics, and first person accounts
to argue that the slaughter on the plains was initiated by a foreign-made innovation and fueled by a
foreign demand for industrial leather.  Ironically, the ultimate cause of this sad chapter in American
environmental history was of European, and not American, origin.
M. Scott Taylor
IEE Canada Research Chair
Department of Economics
The University of Calgary





200 YEARS AGO, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark completed their
epic voyage of Western discovery. Their vivid account of the West￿ s natural
beauty and its limitless wealth spurred on thousands of Americans to carve
out a new life and new nation west of the Mississippi. Westward expansion
with its stories of frontier hardship have shaped much of American national
identity by showing how self-reliance, risk-taking and hard work could tame a
wild frontier. While the 19th century is surely one of the most inspirational
periods in American history, it also bears witness to a less ￿ attering record
with regard to the environment: most signi￿cantly, the slaughter of the plains
bison, or bu⁄alo.1
This paper examines the slaughter using theory, empirics, and ￿rst person
accounts from diaries and other historical documents. It argues that the
story of the bu⁄alo slaughter is surprisingly not, at bottom, an American
one. Instead I argue that the slaughter on the plains was initiated by a
tanning innovation created in Europe, and maintained by a robust European
demand for bu⁄alo hides. These market forces overwhelmed the ability of a
young and still expanding nation, just out of a bloody civil war, to carefully
steward its natural resources.
Speci￿cally, I argue that three conditions are jointly necessary and suf-
￿cient to explain the time pattern of bu⁄alo destruction witnessed in the
nineteenth century. These are: (1) a price for bu⁄alo products that was
largely invariant to changes in supply; (2) open access conditions with no
regulation of the bu⁄alo kill; and (3), a newly invented tanning process that
made bu⁄alo hides into valuable commercial leather.
In the 16th century, North America contained 25-30 million bu⁄alo; by
the late 1880s less than 100 remained wild in the Great Plains states.2 While
removing bu⁄alo east of the Mississippi took settlers over a 100 years, the
remaining 10 to 15 million were killed in a punctuated slaughter in a little
1The term bu⁄alo is a misnomer but I will use it throughout since this is common
usage. The description of the kill as a slaughter is also conventional. It is perhaps wise
to inform the reader at the outset that this paper is concerned exclusively with positive
questions. I leave it to the reader to determine for themselves whether the slaughter was
unfortunate or inevitable.
2The species Bison bison comes with two distinct varieties: the common Plains bison
(Bison, bison, bison ) and the less common Woods bison (Bison, bison, athabascae) found
exclusively in Canada. I focus on the extinction of the plains bison or bu⁄alo in the U.S.,
leaving an examination of the Canadian case for future work.
1over 10 years. Standard explanations hold some combination of U.S. Army
policy, the Railroads, and changes in native hunting practices responsible.
My claim is that (1), (2) and (3) are both necessary and su¢ cient.
The argument I develop proceeds in three steps. First I build a novel
model of bu⁄alo hunting. It assumes potential bu⁄alo hunters di⁄er in their
hunting skill, and allows for easy entry and exit. Entry and exit from hunting
was common, and skill di⁄erences across hunters is an important part of the
historical record.3 For the most part, I take world prices as given and assume
throughout that there are no controls over hunting. The model is made
general equilibrium by the addition of a numeraire good sector which serves
as the outside option for potential bu⁄alo hunters. The general equilibrium
structure is helpful to our discussion of export ￿ ows, and necessary for our
construction of an autarky counterfactual.
The theory delivers two key results. First, it shows how the combination
of an innovation in tanning, ￿xed world prices for hides, and open access to
the herds proved fatal to the bu⁄alo. The innovation in tanning creates fren-
zied entry into hunting, the bu⁄alo herds decline rapidly, and the "harvest"
of bu⁄alo hides for export booms.4 Fixed prices ensure the new supply of
bu⁄alo hides cannot dampen the incentive to hunt; open access ensures that
regulations limiting the kill are not forthcoming; and the tanning innovation
plus hunter heterogeneity delivers a punctuated slaughter followed by rapid
exit. Rigid prices, no controls on hunting, and a slaughter compressed in
time are important and veri￿able features of the historical record.
Second, the theory show how rigid prices are necessary for the story.
An unexpected innovation is just not enough. For example, if prices adjust
considerably to changes in supply - as they typically would if bu⁄alo products
had only a domestic market - then the number of hunters can rise over time
even as the bu⁄alo are wiped out. The "punctuated slaughter" is relatively
smooth over time, and hide prices rise as the bu⁄alo approach extinction. All
of these predictions are inconsistent with the historical record: hide prices
fell slightly over the period; there was massive entry and then exit; and the
3The model is most closely related to Brander and Taylor (1997), but bears some
resemblance to resource models with entry such as Wilen (1976) or Brander and Taylor
(1998).
4The pace of the slaughter was such that many contemporary writers thought extinction
was all but inevitable. Allen, writing in 1876, said "The fate of none of our larger animals
is more interesting than is that of the bison, since total extermination is eventually surer
to none than to this former "monarch of the prairies." p. 71 Allen (1876)
2slaughter was in fact just that.
In sum the theory provides a prima facie case for the importance of
international markets in the slaughter, and directs us to look at international
trade statistics for empirical evidence. Accordingly, the second step is to
examine evidence on U.S. exports of bu⁄alo hides.
A natural consequence of the rapid elimination of the bu⁄alo is that
records of the number killed are non-existent, and only very partial shipping
records exist. U.S. trade statistics from the 19th century contain categories
of exports that contain bu⁄alo products, but no individual entry is labelled
bu⁄alo meat, bu⁄alo robes or bu⁄alo hides. The key series I employ is "hide
and skins exports" and this surely contains both cattle and bu⁄alo hides.
To solve this problem, I employ economic theory and independent work on
the U.S. cattle cycle to construct a time series of bu⁄alo hide exports from
the overall export ￿gures. This constructed series is then cross-checked
for consistency against several pieces of independent evidence. The cross
checks examine the magnitude of the implied exports, their timing, and their
geographic variation. I ￿nd direct supporting evidence of bu⁄alo hide exports
in newspaper accounts, personal diaries, and business directories in importing
countries. In addition, I examine import data from Canada, the UK, and
France that corroborate my ￿ndings. These numerous independent checks
lend support to the constructed series.
The ￿nal step in the argument is to examine the main alternative hy-
potheses in light of our new data. While the model￿ s analytic results prove
that my three conditions are su¢ cient to generate the slaughter they do not
prove necessity. To argue for necessity, I show that the new constructed
export data strongly support the export-driven slaughter hypothesis. The
magnitudes of the export ￿ ows are considerable. Approximately 6 million
bu⁄alo hides are exported over the 1871-1883 period and this represents a
bu⁄alo kill of almost 9 million. The timing of greatest export ￿ ows ￿ts the
historical record extremely well. I then discuss the three major alternative
hypotheses and argue that they do far less well in matching the data.
There is of course a huge literature studying the bu⁄alo and other related
aspects of westward expansion in the 19th century. This literature includes
many contributions from history, political science and sociology but only a
handful of contributions from economics. Perhaps the best known contri-
bution is the 1889 monograph by William Temple Hornaday who was then
the chief taxidermist of the Smithsonian Institute. Hornaday￿ s monograph
"The Extermination of the American Bison" is the classic account of the
3elimination of the bu⁄alo both east and west of the Mississippi. Horna-
day collects ￿gures on the number killed from various sources, and provides
the ￿rst de￿nitive account of the slaughter. Hornaday￿ s account however
make no mention of international trade. Other classic contributions such as
"The Plains of the Great West" by Richard Irving Dodge (1877), and Joel
Allen￿ s 1876 contribution "The American Bisons: Living and Extinct" o⁄er
us ￿rst person accounts (in the case of Dodge), and a scholarly examination
of the process from a naturalist at Harvard, but neither seek to identify the
underlying cause.
More recent work by economists include Dean Lueck (2002) and Bruce
Benson (2006) who focus on property rights issues, and a series of papers
by economic historians linking market forces to overuse and depletion of
renewable resources in earlier centuries.5 Prominent among these are the
series of papers by Carlos and Lewis (1993, 1999) who examine the depletion
of beaver in the 18th century; Patterson and Wilen (1977) who study the
northern paci￿c fur seal hunt; and most recently Allen and Keay (2004) who
study the extinction of the Arctic Bowhead whale.
The work presented here di⁄ers from earlier contributions in several ways.
Most importantly the focus here is on the "slaughter." There is no real
mystery as to why the bu⁄alo were eliminated from their previous ranges
- an expanding population, conversion to agriculture, and industrialization
all spelt the end for the bu⁄alo sometime during the late 19th or early 20th
century. What is surprising is the rate of killing and its variation over time:
one half of the pre-contact bu⁄alo population was killed in just ten years
time post 1870; the elimination of the other half took over 100 years.
This focus on the slaughter is important, and absent from the other con-
tributions. It is important, because a rapid slaughter greatly constrains
the ability of governments and agents to respond and strengthen property
rights institutions. The existence of the slaughter also leads one to ask why
markets didn￿ t adjust to the huge increase in the supply of bu⁄alo products
and thereby slow the carnage. A focus on the slaughter naturally suggests
international markets may have soaked up the excess supply while keeping
prices constant. Investigation of this possibility led to the major contribu-
tion of this work: the identi￿cation of international trade as a key driver in
the process.
5An early and excellent discussion of the slaughter, the hide trade, and the attempts
to legislate hunting is contained in Hanner (1981).
4The earlier contributions from economic history explored rather di⁄erent
positive and normative questions concerning resource depletion. Carlos and
Lewis link variation in depletion rates across trading posts to di⁄erences in
local competition; Patterson and Wilen examine how international rivalry
and transboundary issues a⁄ect depletion; and Allen and Keay ask whether
depletion could have been avoided by enlightened public policy. In each
case there was little debate as to the ultimate source of depletion. The
Bowhead whale was eliminated by Dutch and English whalers over almost
three centuries; while the beaver and seal were depleted by the fur trade,
albeit with the help of new technologies. In contrast, I argue that the usual
suspects held responsible for the slaughter on the plains - the Railroads, the
U.S. Army, Environmental change or altered native hunting practices - are
in fact innocent.
An examination of the slaughter also provides important case study evi-
dence on the speed with which property rights institutions can adapt in the
face of new circumstances. In this case the changed circumstance was an
innovation, and the adjustment, as measured by new regulation, was slow.
In contrast, market responses were immediate and powerful. This relative
speed of adjustment is key to many policy debates. For example, even when
property rights over resources are absent or poorly enforced prior to a trade
liberalization, access to world markets may lead to a strengthening of pro-
tection. It may do so because world markets often value domestic resources
very highly and this provides an incentive to improve resource management.
If this protection is soon forthcoming, then opening up to world markets can
provide both conventional gains from trade and improved resource manage-
ment.6 This tantalizing possibility is however just that - a theoretical pos-
sibility, since there is currently very little empirical evidence directly linking
changes in property rights protection, resource use, and trade liberalization.
Indirect evidence can be gleaned from the empirical literature on trade and
the environment, the related literature linking income gains to pollution re-
duction, and a handful of speci￿c studies questioning the simple link between
lax property rights and resource over use.7
Given the dearth of empirical evidence directly on point, case study evi-
dence is of great value. Looking back to our past provides us with guidance
6See Copeland and Taylor (2004b) for a model with these features.
7On trade, see Copeland and Taylor (2004a); on improved protection, see Grossman and
Krueger (1995); on property rights see Besley (1995); and on the links between protection
and resource over use see Bohn and Deacon (2003) and UNEP (2001).
5for the future. For in the not too distant past, Europe was the high income
developed region, while America was a young still developing country. In the
1870s, America was a large resource exporter with little or no environmental
regulation, while Europe was a high income consumer of U.S. resource prod-
ucts apparently indi⁄erent to the impact their consumption had on America￿ s
natural resources. Written in this way it is apparent that the story of the
bu⁄alo has as much relevance today as it did 130 years ago. Many develop-
ing countries in the world today are heavily reliant on resource exports, are
struggling with active or recently past civil wars fueled by racial strife, and
few, if any, have stringent regulations governing resource use. The global-
ization pressures these nations face today, and the policy choices they have
to make, are not too di⁄erent from those facing the U.S. in the late 19th
century.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I set out impor-
tant background material on the history and biology of the bu⁄alo which is
generally not known. In section 3, I construct the hunting model to examine
how the time path of bu⁄alo kills responds to an unexpected tanning inno-
vation. In section 4 I construct the bu⁄alo-hide-export data, and provide
a series of cross-checks. Section 5 considers alternative hypotheses, while
section 6 concludes. Two appendices follow.
2 History and Biology
Bu⁄alo are the largest terrestrial mammals in North America, and have been
since the Pleistocene extinctions over 10,000 years ago. Earliest recorded
European observations came from Spanish explorers in the early 1500s who
remarked on the vast herds of native cattle in present day Mexico. Similar
observations were subsequently made by French and English explorers in
other regions of North America. The newcomers were unanimous in their
appraisal of bu⁄alo as "innumberable" or "countless" and the country was
famously described as "one black robe" of bu⁄alo.
The American explorers, Lewis and Clark, met bu⁄alo at many points
along their voyage of discovery. On their return voyage in 1806 at the
mouth of the Yellowstone river where it meets the Missouri, they recorded:
"The bu⁄alo now appear in vast numbers. A herd happened to be on their
way across the river [the Missouri]. Such was the multitude of these animals
that although the river, including an island over which they passed, was a
6mile in length, the herd stretched as thick as they could swim completely
from one side to the other, and the party was obliged to stop for an hour."
Since extrapolating from any ￿rst person account can lead to serious er-
ror, it is not surprising then that early estimates of the bu⁄alo population
vary from over 100 million to less than 20 million.8 The most reliable popula-
tion estimates come to a ￿gure somewhere between 25 and 30 million bu⁄alo.
The estimates are constructed by multiplying the carrying capacity on agri-
cultural land with estimates of the original bu⁄alo range of almost 3 million
square miles. Bu⁄alo were in all of the lower 48 (save the New England
states), the four westernmost Canadian provinces and its two territories, and
the northernmost part of present day Mexico.
2.1 Habitat Destruction and Subsistence Hunting
The bu⁄alo east of the Mississippi were removed by a combination of habitat
destruction and subsistence hunting. The gradual removal of bu⁄alo pro-
ceeded westward when settlers crossed the Allegheny mountains into Ken-
tucky in the early 1800s. It continued unabated for the next ￿fty years
as settlers moved towards the "Great Plains" at approximately the 98th
meridian. By 1820 or 1830, bu⁄alo were largely gone east of the Mississippi.
During much of this early period natives hunted the bu⁄alo not only for their
own subsistence needs but also to trade bu⁄alo robes at forts and towns. A
bu⁄alo robe is the thick and dark coat of a bu⁄alo that is killed in mid winter.
Robes could be used as throws for carriages, or cut to make bu⁄alo coats and
other fur items. They were a popular item in the 19th century and they
made their way to eastern markets by transport along the Missouri river to
St. Louis or overland via the Santa Fe trail. In the 1840s settlers pushed
through the Great Plains into Oregon and California. The movement of the
49ers to California and the Nevada gold rush years brought a steady stream
of tra¢ c through the Platte river valley. Subsistence hunting along the trail
plus the movement of cattle and supplies, divided the existing bu⁄alo herd
into what became known as the Southern and Northern herds.
The division of herds became permanent with the building of the Union
Paci￿c railroad through the Platte River valley in the 1860s. The railroad
8The naturalist Thomas Seton (1909) estimated the population circa 1600 at 75 million,
but with little factual basis. The historian Dan Flores (1991) employed a more transparent
method to arrive at a ￿gure of 27 million.
7created a local demand for bu⁄alo meat, and brought sport hunters, inquis-
itive easterners and foreign dignitaries eager to go out West on a bu⁄alo
hunt. While subsistence hunting for the railroad crews surely had some
e⁄ect on bu⁄alo numbers, as did the railroad￿ s popular day trips to kill buf-
falo, the harried bu⁄alo herds withdrew from the tracks creating a 50 mile
wide corridor centered on the Union Paci￿c line.9 The railroads also provided
transportation for bu⁄alo products to eastern and foreign markets, but in the
1860s railway cars were not refrigerated, and hence bu⁄alo meat was only
marketed as salted, cured or smoked.
Despite the railroads, the market for bu⁄alo robes, the increase in sub-
sistence hunting, and the conversion of the high prairie to agriculture, Utley
notes that "contemporaries detected no major reduction in the abundance
of the species. Most observers thought the killing was not greater than the
natural increase of the species and expected the extermination of the bu⁄alo
from the High Plains would occur gradually over a span of decades in a man-
ner similar to what had happened east of the 99th meridian."10 The force
of habitat destruction was minimal on the Great Plains. In 1860, they held
only 164 thousand people on an area of 416 million acres. Farms were less
than 1% of the land area.
The Civil War brought a temporary reprieve for the bu⁄alo. Major bat-
tles occurred in regions with few or no bu⁄alo, and these years provided a
break from the slow but steady destruction that had marched westward. De-
spite this reprieve, settlement and habitat destruction had taken some toll:
estimates of the bu⁄alo population in 1865 range from 10 to 15 million.
9To see why subsistence and sport hunting could make only a small dent in the herd
a little calculation is helpful. If the carrying capacity of the Great Plains was 15 million
bu⁄alo, and if we take their intrinsic growth rate at .2, then (using the logistic growth
equation for the bu⁄alo) a maximum sustainable yield population of 7.5 million allows
for a yearly sustainable kill of 750,000 bu⁄alo. To put this in perspective, the most
famous bu⁄alo hunter ever known - Bu⁄alo Bill Cody - was an entrepreunial young boy
of 18 when he o⁄erred to supply the Union Paci￿c workers with bu⁄alo meat. William
Cody got the contract with Union Paci￿c, but even his own (perhaps in￿ ated) accounts
indicate he killed only 4 to 5 thousand bu⁄alo per year. Hornaday claims that killing by
whites, natives and half-breeds totalled less than 500,000 before 1870 and was sustainable
(Hornaday, (1889) p.466.) .
10See Utley (2003), p. 243.
82.2 The Innovation
The temporary reprieve ended quickly when in 1870 or 1871 tanners in Eng-
land and Germany developed a method for tanning bu⁄alo hides into useful
leather. While natives had always been able to tan the thick haired bu⁄alo
hides taken in winter months into bu⁄alo robes, their process was laborious
and required ingredients from bu⁄alo themselves (the brain, liver, and fat or
tallow). A cheap simple commercial process was as yet unknown. Various
historical accounts attribute the breakthrough to tanners in Germany and
still others to English tanners. Many accounts suggest the "innovation" was
soon imitated by U.S. tanners, but exactly when and where is unclear.
There are several elements of the innovation that are important to dis-
cuss: its timing, the initial location of the innovation in one or more foreign
countries, the fact that it represented a shock to the bu⁄alo hunting indus-
try, the use to which bu⁄alo hides were put once tanned, and the eventual
di⁄usion of the innovation to other countries.
The hardest evidence for timing and location is given by a London Times
article reporting from New York city in August of 1872. It reports that a
few enterprising New Yorkers thought that bu⁄alo hides might be tanned for
leather, and when the hides arrived they were "sent to several of the more
prominent tanners who experimented upon them in various ways, but they
met with no success. Either from want of knowledge or a lack of proper
materials, they were unable to render the hides soft or pliable, and therefore
they were of no use to them."
The report continues to note "several bales of these hides were sent to
England, where they were readily taken up and orders were immediately
sent to this country for 10,000 additional hides. These orders were ful￿lled,
and since then the trade has continued." Further still, the methods are
spelt out "The hides are collected in the West by the agents of Eastern
houses; they are simply dried, and then forwarded to either New York or
Baltimore for export...The low price that these goods have reached on the
English market, and the prospect of a still further decline, may in time put
an end to this trade, but at present the hides are hunted for vigorously, and,
if it continues, it will take but a few years to wipe the herds out of existence
(my emphasis)."11
11It appears this article is unknown to other researchers: see "Bu⁄alo Hides: Some
eight or ten months ago", The Times, August 17, 1872, pg. 4, Issue 27458, col. F. It is
not known who the enterprising New Yorkers were, although one possibility is William C.
9A secondary account comes from Gard (1960, p.90) "In 1870, J. N.
DuBois, a Kansas City dealer in hides, furs and wool shipped several bales of
bu⁄alo hides to Germany, where tanners had developed a process for making
them into good leather. Other orders followed, and soon some American
tanners either learned of this process or developed a similar one of their own.
In the spring of 1871, DuBois sent hundreds of circulars out to the bu⁄alo
ranges, o⁄ering to buy at attractive price all hides taken at any time of the
year. DuBois also encouraged the hunters by telling them how to peg the
hides, ￿ esh side up, for drying. In addition, he sold them a poison, imported
from South America, to kill the bugs that infested and damaged many of the
hides."12
Putting these together it appears the innovation was made in England
and Germany at roughly the same time in 1871. Importantly, U.S. tanners
were unable to tan bu⁄alo hides at this time.
The fact that the innovation was an unexpected shock is of little doubt,
and supported by many accounts. The account of bu⁄alo hunter George
"Hodoo" Brown is especially on point as it provides evidence on both the
timing and unexpectedness of the innovation. When returning from a meat
hunting trip in May of 1871 to Fort Wallace, Brown had the following con-
versation with fellow hunters at the fort:
"We told them the weather was getting so warm it was almost impossible
to get meat to market before it spoiled. They said to me, ￿ Why don￿ t you
skin them and just take the hides, and let the meat lay?￿ I says, ￿ What the
devil would I do with the hides?￿One man said, ￿ Ship them to Leavenworth
to W.C. Lobenstine. He￿ ll buy your hides and send a check￿ . So Burdett
and I on our next trip went to skinning."13
Other accounts attest to the unexpectedness of the innovation and the
introduction of bu⁄alo hides as a valuable commodity. It is less clear however
how bu⁄alo tanned leather was used, and why it had such a strong foreign
demand. The literature mentions two uses for the leather. The ￿rst was
for sole leather, with a burgeoning European demand coming from re￿tting
Lobenstein (a pelt dealer with an o¢ ce in Levingworth Kansas) who "is well known as the
￿rst dealer to introduce bu⁄alo hides to the market" Fort Gri¢ n Echo, April 19th, 1879.
Lobenstein later lived on the Upper East side of Manhattan.
12Spoilage was a problem. Green hides collected by farmers and hunters soon rotted.
Once commercial tanning was available, hides could be preserved before tanning by placing
them in a lime solution. This removed hair and facilitated shipping as a wet hide.
13Interview with George W. Brown reported in Gilbert et al. (2003), page 55.
10armies in the post 1870 period. Speci￿cally, several sources mention the
British Army and its demand for bu⁄alo leather as it was tougher and thicker
than cow hide.
Bu⁄alo hunter John R. Cook￿ s account attests to this view. Cook re-
counts his conversation with J.L. Hickey (a buying agent of W.C. Lobenstine
the hide dealer mentioned above) when the two of them brought in Cook￿ s
hides for transport. "In a few moments we were saddled up and o⁄. I
found him to be a good conversationalist, well informed and in possession of
knowledge upon the latest current events. He said all of Loganstein [sic] &
Company￿ s hides went to Europe, that all the English Army accouterments
of leather were being replaced with bu⁄alo leather."14
In addition to sole leather, the tough bu⁄alo hides found use as industrial
belting for machinery in England and elsewhere on the continent. Many
secondary sources make this connection, but primary source evidence is also
available from English business directories. For example, Slater￿ s Royal
National Commercial Directories at the time list numerous tanners, hide
merchants, and leather belt manufacturers in their directory of trades. These
businesses list as products bu⁄alo hides, bu⁄alo skips, bu⁄alo hide shavings,
bu⁄alo pickers, and strapping for cotton gins.15
The eventual di⁄usion of the innovation to tanners in the U.S. and other
European countries is more di¢ cult to establish, although often claimed in
the literature (recall for example Gard￿ s account). The best evidence of di⁄u-
sion of the innovation to U.S. tanners comes from NY Chamber of Commerce
Annual reports that list price quotes for hemlock tanned sole leather made
from a variety of hides (Buenos Ayres, California, etc.). These price quotes
do not include bison in the early 1870s, but price quotes for bison tanned
leather soles ￿rst appear in the 1877/1878 report, continue for 1878/1879,
and then disappear the following year. This suggests the innovation may
have di⁄used to U.S. tanners by the late 1870s.16
14Excerpted from Cook, John R. The Border and the Bu⁄alo, Crane and Company,
Topeka, 1907. Reprint by State House Press, Austin, 1989. Primary evidence for Hickey￿ s
role in the hide trade is found in numerous ads placed in the Fort Gri¢ n Echo listing him
as a buying agent for W.C. Lobenstein.
15See for example in Slaters Business Directory, 1879 for Manchester and Salford, adver-
tising by John Tullis & Son Tanners and Curriers and Leather Belt Manufacturers, p.80;
the list of hide dealers and merchants, p.103; the advertising by Heyworth & Law Tanners
and Curriers and manufacturers of Machine Belting, p.126; the advertising of Hepburn &
Sons, Tanners and Curriers & Leather Factors, p.85.
16I say "may have" since the U.S. was importing large volumes of leather products
11Evidence for di⁄usion to other countries is also di¢ cult to establish, but
here again business directories help. For example, the Foreign Appendix
to Slater￿ s Business Directory of London in 1884 lists the Poullain Brothers
of Paris as Tanners specializing in straps and leather for steam works and
bu⁄alo leather rubbers for spinning mills. Given the di⁄usion to U.S. tanners
in the 1870s and the close proximity of most European countries, di⁄usion
from England and Germany to other countries seems highly likely.
2.3 The Flint Hide Market
Regardless of the innovation￿ s source, its e⁄ect on the Great Plains was
electrifying. The market for bu⁄alo hides boomed; bu⁄alo hunters already
in the ￿eld - like George "Hodoo" Brown - started to skin bu⁄alo for their
￿ int (hairless) hides, and hundreds if not thousands of others soon joined in
the hunt. Previous to the innovation, hides taken from the Southern Herd
or hides taken in all but three winter months were virtually worthless as fur
items. The only saleable commodity from a bu⁄alo killed in these regions or
times was its meat, but this market was severely limited by transportation
costs. With the advent of a ￿ int-hide market, killing a bu⁄alo anywhere and
at anytime became a pro￿table venture. By 1872 a full scale hide-boom was
in progress.
Although no accurate ￿gures are available, Colonel Richard Irving Dodge
(of Dodge city fame) estimated the bu⁄alo kill in Kansas at close to 3.5
million bu⁄alo over the 1872-1874 period.17 Once the herd in Kansas dis-
appeared the hunters turned south. Reports of large herds south of the
Arkansas river, lured hunters into land granted to the Comanches in the
Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867. Hunting south of the Arkansas was a dan-
gerous game and a major battle between hide hunters and Comanches oc-
curred at Adobe walls in June of 1874. A short bu⁄alo war ensued, but
the U.S. Army eliminated the Indian threat by 1875. In doing so the Army
opened up the whole of present day Oklahoma, western Texas and eastern
New Mexico to the hide hunters.
The business of hide hunting did not last long - less than 7 years in Kansas
and areas to the south. And when the Southern Herd was eliminated in 1879,
many hide hunters looked north to the only signi￿cant herd left in existence.
at this time and the bison sole leather could have been imported rather than produced
domestically.
17See Dodge (1877).
12The key bottleneck in the north was the still hostile Sioux. After the defeat of
the Sioux in the late 1870s, the Northern Paci￿c Railroad extended its tracks
west from Bismarck into the heart of the Montana plains reaching Glendive
in 1880 and Miles City in 1881. The Northern Herd was already diminished
by the robe trade that, as early as 1850, sent 200,000 to 300,000 robes yearly
down the Missouri.18 With easy transportation and the elimination of the
Indian threat, hide hunters ￿ ooded the northern range. Hide hunting in the
north reached a peak in 1881 or 1882, and by 1883 the commercial hide hunt
was faltering. In 1884, the last of the ￿ int hides were shipped east.19
2.4 The Road to Conservation
In 1886, William Templeton Hornaday urged his superiors at the Smithsonian
to fund an expedition to kill and mount a grouping of bu⁄alo for posterity.
Although it took Hornaday two expeditions, four months of e⁄ort, and the
help of professional hunting guides, he ￿nally succeeded in collecting speci-
mens for his innovative diorama of bu⁄alo on the Montana plains.20 At this
time, Hornaday estimated the wild bu⁄alo population in Great Plains states
at less than 100.21
The slaughter of the North American bu⁄alo surely represents one of the
saddest chapters in American environmental history. To many Americans
at the time, the slaughter seemed wasteful and wrong as many newspaper
editorials and letters to Congressmen attest, but still little was done to stop
the slaughter. While several Great Plains states enacted legislation to limit
and control the hunt, these laws were ine⁄ective and unenforceable. The
only serious piece of federal legislation was passed by both houses in 1874
only to be killed by a pocket veto by President Grant.
The destruction of the bu⁄alo and the wanton slaughter of other big
18See Robinson (1995, p. 31).
19See Hanner (1981, p. 246).
20An updated version of Hornaday￿ s diorama can be seen today by visiting the American
Museum of Natural History in New York or via their website at www.amnh.org (search
for bison and pronghorn diorama).
21In response to the rising scarcity several ranchers thought it worthwhile to capture and
breed bison. Famed Texas Rancher Charles Goodnight obtained several bu⁄alo from the
panhandle that were remnants of the great Southern herd. These animals became of one
￿ve foundation herds in the U.S. from which almost all bison are descended. Other bison
herds were collected and some of these became the foundation stock for the Yellowstone
herd set up in the early 1890s.
13game across the west did however pay some dividend. The slaughter of the
bu⁄alo in particular was pivotal in the rise of the Conservation movement
in the late 19th and early 20th century. Almost all of the important players
in the Conservation movement experienced the slaughter ￿rst hand - Teddy
Roosevelt, John James Audobon, John Muir and William Hornaday.22 The
creation of the national park system in general, and the Yellowstone herd in
particular, are a direct consequence of the revulsion many felt to the slaughter
on the Great Plains. Because of these e⁄orts, over 300,000 bu⁄alo are alive
today in reserves and commercial ranches across North America.
2.5 Bu⁄alo Biology
Bu⁄alo are enormous animals. Mature males are 10-12 feet in length, 6.5
feet in height, and weigh up to 2500 lbs. Female bu⁄alo are proportionately
smaller but still very large weighing up to 1500 lbs. They are also surprisingly
agile given their size and weight: bu⁄alo can broad jump over 15 feet, jump 6
foot high fences and run at a top speed of 40 m.p.h. for several miles. Bu⁄alo
have very poor eyesight, good hearing and a very acute sense of smell. Their
natural predators are few: grizzly bears are an occasional predator, while
wolves are a threat to the herd￿ s sick, old and the very young.
Bu⁄alo are perhaps more fecund than cattle with rates of net fertility in
the range of .15-.25. Breeding can occur at anytime of the year but peak
season is from early June to the fall. In a well nourished herd, 85 to 90%
of the mature cows will bear a calf in the spring. Not surprisingly, given
their original abundance, bu⁄alo make very e¢ cient use of prairie grasses.
While they have four stomachs like cattle and other bovines, their slower
metabolism withdraws more energy from the same grass.23
These features of bu⁄alo biology determined much of their history. Given
their size, dexterity and speed, killing a bu⁄alo using stone tools is not a
simple task. Even though natives used bu⁄alo jumps, surrounds, and pens
to kill bu⁄alo en masse, subsistence hunting could only have a small impact
22The badge worn by National Park Service employees features a bu⁄alo bull modeled
after the bull killed and mounted by Hornaday in his bu⁄alo diorama. Hornady became
the ￿rst director of the Bronx Zoo, and was the ￿rst head of the American Bison Society.
The bu⁄alo bull imortalized on the bu⁄alo nickel was modeled after a large bull in the live
bu⁄alo collection created by Hornaday at the Bronx Zoo. There are numerous Hornaday
awards given by Conservation groups all across America.
23See Lott (2002).
14on a population with such a robust growth rate. Before European contact,
bu⁄alo numbers were kept in check by natural and not man made limits.
Given their 3 million square miles of range, huge bu⁄alo herds result.
Two other features of bu⁄alo biology play an important role in their
history. Bu⁄alo divide into sex segregated herds for much of the year. Bull
herds and cow-calf herds are the predominate forms, although for some time
of the year yearlings also separate. Only during the spring and summer (May
through August depending on location) do these herds meet and congregate
on the open plains. During the rest of the year the herds divide up into
much smaller groups of 60 to 100 that seek out small river valleys and other
sheltered locations where vegetation is more plentiful and winter storms less
severe. As a consequence, the time to e¢ ciently kill large numbers of bu⁄alo
is in the summer months when they are concentrated on the open plains.24
While hunting in winter meant facing di¢ cult winter conditions, ￿nding
only small groups of bu⁄alo, and obtaining less meat from the leaner bu⁄alo,
it is during winter that the bu⁄alo￿ s thick coat reaches its pinnacle. Starting
in early fall, bu⁄alo regrow their winter coat which they then subsequently
shed in the spring. Winter coats are dark and thick and make handsome
bu⁄alo robes when tanned; summer coats are thin, scru⁄y and not suitable
for the robe market. Bu⁄alo hides suitable for "bu⁄alo robes" were taken
only during three months of the winter, and some bu⁄alo on the southernmost
ranges never sported a robe worth taking.
These last two features of bu⁄alo biology played a critical role in limiting
the market for bu⁄alo products. When bu⁄alo were easy to kill, their robes
were virtually worthless; when they were di¢ cult to kill, their robes were
valuable. Nature inadvertently endowed the bu⁄alo with a defense against
over exploitation.
European contact and the conversion of lands east of the Mississippi to
agriculture, changed the bu⁄alo￿ s limiting factor from nature to man. Hunt-
ing increased and was spurred on by both a domestic and world demand for
bu⁄alo robes, but this demand could not exceed a supply constrained by the
natural rhythms of bu⁄alo biology and the supply bottleneck created by a
laborious native tanning process. Even after the civil war, the Great Plains
were virtually deserted, and this left the bu⁄alo much of the most produc-
24The herds could be immense with many reported herds containing 50 to 100 thousand
animals. Colonel Irving Dodge in 1871 came across a herd along the Arkansas river near
Fort Larned that was subsequently estimated (by Horndady see (1889, p.390) to contain
4 million bu⁄alo. Dodge￿ s original account is contained in Dodge (1877, p.120).
15tive mid-grass prairie in Kansas, Oklahoma and northern Texas. Absent an
innovation that made full time bu⁄alo hunting possible, the bu⁄alo popula-
tion would have trended slowly downward for decades as it had east of the
Mississippi. History however was not so kind to the bu⁄alo.
3 The Model
I develop a simple dynamic model where agents hunt for bu⁄alo or work in
the outside good sector. Bu⁄alo hunters were typically young single men
with relatively low opportunity costs and limited skills. Many were civil
war veterans or new immigrants who had moved west seeking their fortune.
Their alternative occupations as laborers in frontier towns, cow punchers,
soldiers, or railroad crew workers rarely paid very well.25 To someone with
limited skills, except perhaps with a ri￿ e, bu⁄alo hunting was a potential
road to riches.
Not surprisingly, entry and exit from bu⁄alo hunting was common. In-
deed the explosion of activity at the start of hide hunting in the early 1870s
was nothing less than spectacular. Historic accounts describe an industry of
hunters that grew from a small cottage industry that supplied nearby towns
and railroad crews with meat to an army of thousands that lined rivers and
closed o⁄all avenues of escape. Since the entry and exit margin is so impor-
tant to capture, I will determine the number of active hunters endogenously
while representing the pool of potential hunters by a continuum of agents
with mass N.
3.1 Individual Decisions
Potential bu⁄alo hunters were distributed throughout the Great Plains, but
concentrated in small towns and forts near known bu⁄alo ranges. I assume
potential hunters di⁄er in their hunting skill but are equally productive work-
ing in any one of the number of low-skilled occupations represented by the
outside good sector. Di⁄erences in hunting skill are important in determin-
25Teddy Roosevelt described them as "absolutely shiftless and improvident; they had
no settled habits; they were inured to peril and hardship, but entirely unaccustomed to
steady work; and so they a⁄orded just the materials which to make the bolder and more
desperate kinds of criminals", Roosevelt (1889, p.13). More detailed, and less harsh,
personal accounts are compiled in Gilbert et al. (2003).
16ing a margin for entry and exit, but they also re￿ ect the very real fact that
some hunters are simply better than others.
When faced with the opportunity to hunt, a potential hunter has two
choices: ignore the herd and remain in the outside good sector; or join in
the hunt. If an agent hunts, they earn the value of harvest ph over the next
increment of time dt, where h is the quantity of bu⁄alo killed and p the price
of bu⁄alo products obtained from a kill. If the hunter remains in the outside
good sector they earn the value of their marginal product given by their wage
w. All prices and costs are measured in terms of the outside good which we
take as the numeraire; therefore p is the relative price of bu⁄alo products.
Let S(t) denote the size of the bu⁄alo herd in physical units at time
t. Then assuming a hunter￿ s productivity is proportional to the size of the
herd, a hunter with skill ￿ earns ph = p￿S(t) per unit time.26 To allow for
skill di⁄erences across hunters let ￿ 2 [0;
_
￿] with F(￿) being the distribution
function of hunting skill.27 With these assumptions in place the marginal
hunter, if one exists, is de￿ned by his/her productivity, ￿￿, such that:
p￿
￿S = w (1)
where the dependence of S on time has been suppressed. Assuming free
entry and exit, we obtain a simple division of agents at any point in time.
Any potential hunter with skill ￿ ￿ ￿￿ hunts; the remainder work in the
outside good sector.28
3.2 Resource constraints
Two aggregate constraints close the model. The ￿rst is simply an adding up
constraint. Agents hunting plus those in the outside good sector must add
up to the entire population. If the mass of potential hunters is N, the total
26Setting ph = p￿￿(S(t)) with ￿(0) = 0, ￿0 > 0; and ￿00 < 0 makes little di⁄erence to
the results.
27Some productivity ￿gures are available in the literature; for example, W.S. Glenn
reports that a remarkable hunter can kill 75-100 per day; an average hunter 50; a common
hunter 25, and others hardly enough to run a camp. See Strickland (1949).
28There were ￿xed and sunk set up costs in hunting which I am ignoring here for
simplicity. An earlier version of the model allowed hunters to make a truly dynamic
investment decision when they choose to hunt. The more complicated model yielded
predictions very close to those given by this simpler set up. Occam￿ s razor, and seminar
participants, pushed me to adopt the simpler speci￿cation.
17number of active hunters is N[1￿F(￿￿)], while NF(￿￿) work in the outside
good sector. Since ￿￿ > 0 (recall 1), the outside good is always produced.
Assuming constant returns in the outside goods sector, and choosing units
such that output equals labor input, w = 1 at all times.
The second constraint links the bu⁄alo kill to the evolution of herd size.
De￿ne K(￿￿;S), as the number of bu⁄alo killed per unit time when the herd
is of size S, and agents with productivity no less than ￿￿ are engaged in







where the density of bu⁄alo hunters with productivity ￿ is F 0(￿) = f(￿),
their mass is Nf(￿), and their productivity in hunting is ￿S. I refer to
2 as the kill function. Since the marginal hunter is determined at every
moment in time by the prevailing price and herd size using 1, we obtain with
a slight abuse of notation, K(￿￿(p;S);S) ￿ K(p;S). K(p;S) is the number
of bu⁄alo killed per unit time when the herd is of size S, and the price of
bu⁄alo products is p.














dS < 0, from 1. When the herd grows in size two things happen: the
productivity of inframarginal hunters rises, and new hunters enter as hunting
now generates rents for even the low skilled. The combination of increased
entry and greater productivity for those already present means bu⁄alo kills
rise with herd size.
When the herd becomes small just the opposite occurs: agents exit and
average productivity drops. As a result, there will exist a herd so small
that only the most skilled ￿nd it worthwhile to hunt. Since the highest
productivity hunters have productivity,
_
￿, the smallest herd size ever hunted,
Ss must satisfy:
_
￿ = w=pSs (4)
When p is su¢ ciently high we have Ss ￿ C where C is the carrying capacity
of the Great Plains.
18Rational agents will never hunt a herd if S < Ss. Taking this complica-
tion into account, the kill function becomes:





￿f(￿)d￿ if Ss < S ￿ C
To determine the dynamics of herd size I combine the kill function with
an assumption on how the herd grows over time. For simplicity, I assume
herd size grows in accordance with a standard compensatory growth function
drawn from resource economics. Biological growth, G(S), is assumed to be
a positive (strictly) concave function of herd size. Natural growth is zero
when the bu⁄alo are gone G(0) = 0, and zero when the bu⁄alo reach the
carrying capacity of the Great Plains, G(C) = 0.
The evolution of herd size can now be written as:
￿
S = G(S) ￿ K(p;S) (6)
With no hunting at all, K(p;S) = 0 and the bu⁄alo population would return
to its carrying capacity C. With active hunting the herd will be smaller, and
could in principle be driven to zero depending on parameter values. Solving
6 (subject to an initial condition) generates a time pro￿le for the bu⁄alo
herd, the kill, hunter numbers, and the output of the outside good.
3.3 Steady State Solution
A typical interior steady state is shown in Figure 1. The growth function
G(S) starts at S = 0, rises and then returns to zero growth when the herd
reaches its carrying capacity at C. A typical kill function is also shown. The
kill is zero for small herd sizes, but at Ss (p) hunting begins and then grows
in intensity. The kill function is not necessarily convex (as shown), but even
when it is not, under mild conditions, there is a unique interior solution .
Proposition 1. Assume: C > Ss, then there exists
i) a unique interior steady state herd size S￿ 2 [Ss;C];
ii) a unique marginal hunter ￿￿(p;S￿) 2 (0;
_
￿); and,
iii) a unique division of agents across activities.
Proof: See Appendix A.
19Uniqueness and existence are guaranteed by very weak conditions. An
interior steady state can only exist if bu⁄alo hunting is pro￿table for some
agent at some herd size. If the carrying capacity is greater than the smallest
pro￿table herd size we have C > Ss, and p
_
￿C > w from 4. This implies
bu⁄alo hunting can provide rents to the most productive hunters when the
herd is close to carrying capacity. The steady state also determines the
productivity of the marginal hunter ￿￿ = m(p;S￿), the number of hunters
N[1￿F(￿￿)], their aggregate kill K(p;S￿), and the number of agents in the
outside good sector NF(￿￿).
It is clear from Figure 1 that the interior steady state is globally stable.
Starting from any positive stock level S > 0, convergence to the steady state
is monotonic. If the initial stock is very low, no hunting occurs, the bu⁄alo
herd grows in response and this brings about the introduction of hunting and
a reduced rate of herd growth. Starting with a very large herd size, the kill
exceeds natural growth and herd size falls. For future purposes we note:
Proposition 2. When a unique interior steady state exists, it is globally
stable. Starting from any positive bu⁄alo herd size S > 0, convergence to
the steady state is monotonic.
Proof: See Appendix A.
3.4 Slaughter on the Great Plains
For the most part I focus on the destruction of the Southern Herd as this was
the immediate result of the tanning innovation and signalled the introduction
of the hide market.
The introduction of bu⁄alo hide tanning was a positive price shock for
bu⁄alo products. Before the tanning innovation, a bu⁄alo hunter would kill
for some combination of the animal￿ s meat (including the tongue) and robe.
A bu⁄alo kill was a joint product yielding a ￿xed ratio of several outputs
each with its own price. Once the tanning of bu⁄alo hides was possible, the
composition of these outputs changed to include hides. Historic accounts
are clear that the introduction of the hide market vastly increased the return
to bu⁄alo hunting so that most meat was left to rot on the plains, and killing
took place in regions where robes were of poor quality (much of the southern
U.S.) and at times of the year when robes were virtually worthless. All of
this implies that we should model the impact of the tanning innovation as
20raising the e⁄ective price for a bu⁄alo kill from p to p0.29
The historical account is also fairly clear that before the tanning inno-
vation, bu⁄alo numbers were falling although slowly. Hunting pressure and
eventually habitat destruction would have led bu⁄alo numbers to fall as they
had east of the Mississippi, but the strength of these two forces was weak in
the 1860s. To capture this feature of the pre-1870 period, I assume the econ-
omy was operating somewhere along its transition path to an initial steady
state when the price shock hit.
3.4.1 Destroying the Southern Herd
In Figure 2 I plot the growth function and two kill functions K(p;S) and
K(p0;S). Prior to 1870 the value of a bu⁄alo kill was given by p, and hence
the kill function K(p;S) intersects the horizontal axis at Ss(p); the steady
state corresponding to this price is given by A. I assume the economy
was moving along K(p;S) towards the steady state at A from the right.
Bu⁄alo numbers were falling, but slowly. Without the tanning innovation,
the economy would have moved closer to A over time with falling bu⁄alo
numbers, lower rents and fewer hunters. An important feature of the model
is that with small rents in bu⁄alo hunting prior to the innovation, only a
small number of agents are active in hunting even though rents are positive.
The tanning innovation changed all that. When the price shock hit, the
kill function shifts to K(p0;S), dramatically raising the kill. There is a ￿ ood
of new entry as the hunting skill needed to justify entry drops discretely
from ￿￿(p;S0), to ￿￿(p0;S0). The boom in new entrants raises the rate of
bu⁄alo kill abruptly and the slaughter begins. As the bu⁄alo boom unwinds
the economy moves along K(p0;S). The number of bu⁄alo hunters falls,
average productivity falls, and the killings fall. Over time, the economy
moves towards its new steady state at B. Summarizing:
Proposition 3. An unexpected permanent price shock:
i) raises the number of bu⁄alo hunters and kill on impact;
ii) leads to exit and falling bu⁄alo kills along the transition path; and,
iii) lowers the steady state bu⁄alo herd.
Proof: See Appendix A.
29Modeling the tanning innovation as an increase in harvesting productivity ￿ would
not be correct. Tanning did not increase the technical e¢ ciency of bu⁄alo hunting, it just
raised the economic returns to it.
21The transition path exhibits overshooting in the number of hide hunters
for a simple reason: rents cannot last. Relatively high cost hunters enter to-
day knowing that this will be a short-lived game, and as the herd diminishes,
more and more hunters retire from bu⁄alo hunting. Only those with very low
hunting costs remain in the industry. The new steady state features more
hunters chasing fewer but more valuable bu⁄alo, with the marginal hunter
again receiving no rents at all.
It is apparent from the ￿gure that both the bu⁄alo herd and the number
of bu⁄alo hunters adjusts when prices rise. Surprisingly, the steady state
bu⁄alo kill may rise or fall in response. The kill rises if the bu⁄alo herd
exceeded C=2 prior to the price shock and the price shock itself was marginal.
In all other cases it falls. Since Hornaday estimated that less than 100
bu⁄alo were left in the wild by the late 1880s while C is perhaps 25 million,
the S￿ < C=2 case is most relevant to our discussion. In this case, the
aggregate kill, in steady state, falls with the price shock.
3.4.2 Destroying the Northern Herd
The history of the Northern Herd is slightly more complicated. By the mid
1870s, the innovation and the advent of the ￿ int hide market were all in place,
but the boom in northern hunting did not occur until 1881. The reason for
the delay seems to be the hostile Sioux nation.30 The Sioux nation was the
last signi￿cant Indian threat in the U.S., and after the defeat of Custer in
1876 the U.S. Army began an unrelenting campaign to eliminate this threat.
It was only in the early 1880s that the remaining Sioux were either killed or
settled peacefully on reservations. The legendary Crazy Horse surrendered
in 1877, while the chief who defeated Custer - Sitting Bull - surrendered
in 1881. During most of this period, hide hunting in the north was very
dangerous. At virtually the same time, the Northern Paci￿c railroad made
its way into Montana. This surely lowered transport costs and raised the
price bu⁄alo hunters could obtain for a kill.
In terms of our model, the change in hunter safety could be taken as
an exogenous shift rightward in the distribution F(￿). The new railroad
would represent a small price shock, since transportation along the Mis-
souri by steam ship was already an available and well used transportation
30At this time, the Sioux, Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapho were not yet part
of the reservation system. They were led by the most important non-treaty chief: Sitting
Bull.
22option. These two shocks work in much the same way and generate the
same dynamics as the initial tanning innovation. Therefore, while it is un-
clear what determined the exact timing of the Northern Herd￿ s slaughter,
the model￿ s assumptions combine to deliver excessive hunting, overshooting,
and a punctuated bu⁄alo slaughter. These are important features of the
northern slaughter.
3.5 The Autarky Counterfactual
The model does a reasonable job in replicating the broad features of what
we know about the hide hunt. The tanning innovation created a great deal
of entry that was subsequently followed by exit. Early hunters earned large
rents as they often left to buy ranches, saloons, or set up stores in frontier
towns.31 Late entrants and the stragglers seemed to do less well. Although
the model is successful in replicating the historical record, it does rely on
a ￿xed price for bu⁄alo products. As such it implies that large exports
of bu⁄alo hides must have occurred over this period, and this is yet to be
proven.
An alternative hypothesis is that tanneries in the eastern U.S. provided
the demand for hides, and in many accounts a strong U.S. domestic demand
for leather is implicated in the slaughter. Evidence for this connection is
however weak. Apart from the price quotes for bison sole leather in the
N.Y. market for 1878 and 1879 (which I discovered), and some mention of
eastern tanneries in Hornaday, I have been unable to ￿nd any direct evidence
in the form of shipments, tanned hide output, etc.32 Census ￿gures from this
period argue against the large scale use of bu⁄alo in tanning, since the total
measured input of raw hides into U.S. tanning and currying, falls short of
the number of cow hides imported plus the (estimated) domestic slaughter.
This leaves no room at all for the millions of bu⁄alo hides to be used in the
U.S. tanning industry. These census ￿gures are only for two years, 1870 and
1880, and we have only estimates for the domestic cow slaughter. Therefore,
the data is not de￿nitive on this issue, and it is useful to ask if the market
31See Gard (1955), the personal accounts reported in Gilbert et al. (2003), and the
highly entertaining ￿rst person account of Frank Mayer "the last living bu⁄alo hunter"
in Mayer and Roth (1958).
32There is an often repeated story of 57 hides sent by Wright Moar to his brother in
N.Y. city who then sold them to Pennsylvannia tanners thus starting the U.S. domestic
market.
23had been purely domestic what would have happened to the bu⁄alo? Is a
￿xed price and robust export market necessary to explain the slaughter on
the plains or is it merely su¢ cient?
To examine these questions I develop an autarky counterfactual by in-
troducing domestic market clearing. Since the elasticity of demand ought
to be critical in determining the price response, I adopt a constant elasticity
of demand formulation where tastes over the two goods: hides and manu-
factures (the outside good) are homothetic. I again solve for the model￿ s
steady state and examine the response of hide hunters to a shock that raises
the value of a bu⁄alo kill (by making their hides useful leather products).
I start by solving for the market clearing price, and then link the equi-
librium price to the prevailing herd size and solve for the marginal hunter
￿￿(p;S). This initial step is necessary because the dynamics of entry and
exit are now more complicated as price adjustment alters the entry decision,
while entry a⁄ects price adjustment.
3.5.1 Market Clearing
The relative supply of hides to manufactures at any point in time is given by









where ￿￿(p;S) is implicitly de￿ned in 1.33
The relative supply of hides to manufactures is increasing in p because
more agents enter bu⁄alo hunting and this generates larger kills while reduc-
ing labor in the outside good sector. An increase in herd size has a similar
e⁄ect.





= ’(p) = ￿[p]
￿￿ (8)
where ￿ > 0 is a demand shifter. Equating supply and demand solves





33RS(p;S) = 0 for p ￿ w=
_
￿S, and is positive otherwise; i.e. there exists a minimum
price needed to generate hunting at any stock.











where "rs;p > 0 is the elasticity of the relative supply curve with respect
to p.34 With this result in hand it is now possible to prove an important
intermediate result:
Lemma 1. Bu⁄alo hunter numbers rise, stay constant, or fall with an
increase in the bu⁄alo herd, S, as ￿ is greater than, equal to, or less than
one in magnitude.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition for Lemma 1 is simple and familiar. Assume the number of
hunters in the ￿eld is ￿xed, and consider an increase in herd size. Relative
supply shifts outwards, lowers prices, and increases the quantity of bu⁄alo
killed. When demand is unitary elastic, the price decline is exactly matched
by the increase in herd size (evaluate 10 at ￿ = 1). Therefore, the marginal
hunter is indi⁄erent to exit as before (recall 1), and the number of hunters
in the ￿eld is una⁄ected by herd size.
When demand is inelastic, the quantity impact of the change in S is
swamped by the resulting price reduction. The marginal hunter must be
more able than before, ￿￿ rises, and exit occurs. When demand is elastic a
larger herd size lowers prices only slightly and this tempts new - relatively
unproductive - entrants to join in the hunt.
Not surprisingly, Lemma 1 has an important bearing on the model￿ s pre-
dictions. Using lemma 1 we know that when ￿ is equal to one, ￿￿ is inde-
pendent of herd size.35 The kill function is a straight line through the origin.
When ￿ is greater than one, d￿￿
dS < 0, and the kill function is positively sloped
as it was before. In both of these cases we can employ the techniques used
in the proof of Proposition 1 to show the autarky steady state is also unique.
But when ￿ is less than one we cannot rule out a negatively sloped kill func-
tion and multiple steady state equilibria. Despite these complications, we
can proceed. To do so we need another intermediate result.
34See the proof to Lemma 1 for a derivation.
35In this case the marginal hunter is still fully determined. ￿￿ adjusts so that the share
of aggregate income spent on bu⁄alo products is equal to the constant Cobb-Douglas share.
25Lemma 2. A positive demand shock d￿ > 0 shifts the kill function
upwards and raises the domestic price for any given herd size, S.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 2 tells us that an autarky demand shock created by the advent
of tanning drives the price of ￿ int hides upwards and raises the kill for any
herd size. Using Lemma 1 and 2 we can now prove.
Proposition 4. Starting from any stable steady state, an unexpected
and permanent demand shock, d￿ > 0:
i) lowers the steady state bu⁄alo herd, S;
ii) raises bu⁄alo hunter numbers on impact;
iii) leads to falling (constant, rising) hunter numbers along the transition
path if ￿ is greater than (equal to, or less than) one in magnitude.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 4 tells us that the autarky counterfactual can only deliver a
boom and bust pattern in hide hunting when demand is su¢ ciently elastic.
When the innovation arrives the demand for bu⁄alo shifts upwards along a
given supply curve. The surge of new entrants raises the kill on impact. Over
time the herd shrinks, the supply curve shifts back, prices rise and hunter
numbers adjust to the combination of changing prices and a shrinking herd
size. When ￿ is greater than one the transition period exhibits excessive
initial entry and then exit along the path to the new steady state. When
demand is unitary elastic, the initial surge of entry is followed by zero exit,
and when demand is inelastic the initial entry is followed by further entry over
time. In all three cases, hide prices rise as the bu⁄alo slaughter continues.
The autarky counterfactual is important in demonstrating that the pat-
tern of boom and bust experienced on the Great Plains is consistent with
the slaughter being fueled by the tanning innovation together with an elastic
domestic demand for bu⁄alo hides. While several authors have argued that
the U.S. had a large domestic demand for industrial leather at the time and
this demand was pivotal in the slaughter, these accounts become less persua-
sive in the face of evidence that the innovation was foreign made, that hide
prices did not rise over the period, and that bu⁄alo hide exports represent a
signi￿cant portion of the slaughter.
264 Empirical evidence
A natural consequence of the rapid and violent slaughter of the bu⁄alo is that
records of the number of bu⁄alo killed are non-existent. Existing academic
work instead relies on a variety of sources to quantify the extent and timing
of the kill. One common estimate of the slaughter￿ s magnitude starts with
estimates of an initial stock of bu⁄alo using carrying capacity estimates of
the Great Plains and then ￿nishes with the observation that by the late
1880s the number in the wild was estimated at less than 100. The di⁄erence
say, between a mid century estimated population of 15 million, and the ￿nal
￿gure of 100 represents the slaughter. While this procedure is valuable in
setting rough parameters for a more detailed accounting, it says little about
the pace of the slaughter, its geographic location, or its ultimate cause.
An alternative approach is to employ data that is available on shipments
of hides by the railroads operating in bu⁄alo country and then amend these
to take account for wastage prior to delivery. In the mid-1870s, Colonel
Richard Irving Dodge contacted the three major railroads serving the main
bu⁄alo hunting areas. Dodge contacted the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe,
the Kansas Paci￿c and the Union Paci￿c railroads asking for data on the
shipments of bu⁄alo products. Of these three, only the Atchison, Topeka
and Santa Fe (ATS) responded and provided ￿gures for hides shipped in
1872, 1873 and 1874.36 It is important to note that these three numbers (one
for each year) for hides shipped are the only data available on the number of
bu⁄alo killed in the Southern Herd. Additional numbers are often presented
in secondary sources, but these additional data come from either extrapo-
lations, estimated wastage adjustments, or estimates of kills by natives and
settlers.
Dodge makes two adjustments to the shipping numbers. First, to correct
for the non-response of the other two major railroads, Dodge multiplied ATS
numbers by three since he viewed the other two as equally likely to have
shipped as many hides. Second, to account for the loss of killed or injured
animals on the ground or the ruining of hides in skinning or transport, Dodge
36The lack of enthusiasm in reporting shipments is not surprising. Most of the states
in the Great Plains were considering or had put in place restrictions on bu⁄alo hunting;
in addition, sentiment out East was moving against the slaughter. The railroads however
needed cartage business and would not have wanted the bad publicity - and perhaps
federal legislation - such revelations could have brought. A good account of the history of
restrictions on bu⁄alo hunting can be found in Hanner (1981).
27in￿ ates individual year shipment data by a factor representing the ratio of
bu⁄alo killed to bu⁄alo hides shipped. In the ￿rst years of the slaughter,
waste was very high and Dodge estimates that in 1871 every hide shipped
represents ￿ve dead bu⁄alo. In 1872 this falls to three, and by 1873 one
shipped hide represents two dead bu⁄alo; ￿nally in 1874 there was very little
waste with one shipped hide representing one and a quarter dead bu⁄alo.
By these methods, Dodge arrives at the estimate of a little over 3 million
bu⁄alo killed from 1872-1874 on the Southern plains. Hornaday (1889) adds
to Dodge￿ s estimate a ￿gure representing hunting by natives and settlers to
arrive at an estimate of 3.7 million.
Estimates of the slaughter in the north are more tenuous. The northern
shipping point was Fort Benton, located in northern Montana on the Mis-
souri until the Northern Paci￿c Railroad hit Miles city. Koucky reports the
number of hides shipped in the peak years of 1881 and 1882 at 270,000.37
Hornaday estimated that the kill o⁄ in the north must have been less than
1.5 million.
It is obvious from this account that very little is known with certainty
about the magnitude and pace of the slaughter. Many observers lamented
the sorry state of the plains at this time - the lines of putrid carcasses, the
bone ￿elds, and the large stack of hides at railroad stations. From these it is
clear that a punctuated slaughter did occur, but its extent and exact timing
are far less certain. Individual eye witness accounts add colorful description
to more factual accounts, but are not of much use in distinguishing between
a slaughter of say 3 million and one of 10 million.
To examine the potential role of international trade in the bu⁄alo￿ s demise
it is of course natural to look at trade statistics, which until now, have
apparently been ignored by researchers in this area. The bene￿t of trade
statistics is that they often provide estimates of key physical and value ￿ ows
when production data are known to be either incomplete or entirely absent.
Governments have a strong incentive to record and meter the value and
volume of materials entering and leaving their country since import and
export taxes were a major source of revenue at the time. Accordingly, trade
statistics often tell a story where production statistics alone cannot. The
same appears to be true here, although with some caveats.
37Robinson (1995, p.140) however presents larger estimates. 250,000 from a dealer H.F.
Douglas, another 180,000 from Custer county, and an additional 200,000 hauled on the
Northern Paci￿c. I have been unable to ￿nd corroborating primary source evidence for
these ￿gures.
284.1 Bu⁄alo Hide Exports
I employ a multi-step procedure for identifying bu⁄alo products in the in-
ternational trade statistics. The procedure starts with the value of U.S.
hide exports from 1865 to 1886.38 To ensure that these are not re-exports
from Canada, Mexico or other countries, I employ an exports from domestic
production series.
I start by converting hide values into hide numbers by de￿ ating value
￿gures for exports, using estimates for hide prices. Hide prices are provided
inconsistently in the series. I generate a complete price series by taking indi-
vidual estimates provided in the data and ￿lling in the gaps using a price in-
dex for leather and leather products provided by Warren and Pearson (1933).
The constructed price series is then checked against other individual price
quotes found in the literature. For example, an additional source for price
data is the series of Annual Reports of the New York Chamber of Commerce
which report prices for important items in the New York market.39 One
item consistently reported over this period is sole leather (hemlock tanned).
This price series can be used in place of the Warren and Pearson index as
a check on our initial construction. There are also numerous price quotes
given in historical documents that list prices paid to hunters for hides or
robes. For example, Hornaday (1886, p.439-440) contains two hide price
series from the 1880s. These prices are for hides inclusive of delivery to east-
ern markets: one gives prices ranging from $2.85 in 1880 to $3.25 in 1884,
while the other presents slightly higher prices at $3.50 per hide throughout.
As with other sources, this data is infrequent, varies with the location of the
hunter, and the type of hide sold (bull, cow, calf, etc.). My own reading
of diary accounts and other primary sources indicates common price quotes
of $2.50 for bull hides, $3.00 for cow hides, and $1.00 for calf hides. Prices
appear to have fallen in the late 1870s, and selling hides was di¢ cult during
the panic of 1873. There are diary accounts of hunters selling hides for as
little as $.75, but I have not found an account where a hide sold for more
than $3.50. Prices to hunters di⁄er of course from the export values since
they exclude the margins introduced by transportation and distribution. A
38See United States, Department of Treasury, Bureau of Statistics, Foreign Commerce
and Navigation of the United States. Available online through Archive of Americana, U.S.
Congressional Serial Set, 1817-1980, published by Readex, a division of Newsbank, inc. at
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/.
39See State of New York Chamber of Commerce Annual Report for the years 1865-1890.
29rough approximation to the price hunters may have obtained is 60% of the
export price.
In Table 1 below I present the series for hide prices developed using the
Warren and Pearson price index and the alternative price series constructed
using the price data drawn from Annual NY Chamber of Commerce reports.
I have also included an estimate of the price a hunter may have received
assuming transportation and distribution account for 40% of the delivered
hide price. Since hides were worthless until 1871, the price-to-hunters series,
starts at zero and then takes a jump upwards when the innovation hit.
Table 1 - Hide Prices ($/Hide)
Year W.P. N.Y. H.P. Year W.P. N.Y. H.P.
1866 4.56 4.74 0 1876 3.25 4.04 2.32
1867 4.12 4.82 0 1877 3.40 3.42 2.43
1868 3.93 4.43 0 1878 2.96 3.03 2.12
1869 4.18 4.66 0 1879 3.12 4.51 2.23
1870 3.99 4.51 0 1880 3.53 3.58 2.52
1871 3.93 4.35 2.81 1881 3.40 3.42 2.43
1872 4.06 4.35 2.90 1882 3.37 3.26 2.41
1873 4.12 4.35 2.94 1883 3.34 3.34 2.38
1874 3.99 4.20 2.85 1884 3.46 3.26 2.47
1875 3.84 3.89 2.74 1885 3.28 3.58 2.34
Notes: W.P. is hide prices found using the Warren and Pearson price index. N.Y. is
hide prices found using data drawn from the Annual NY Chamber of Commerce reports.
H.P. is the price-to-hunters series.
All of the constructed price series exhibit a slight downward trend over
time. For example, the WP export price for hides was $3.93 in 1871 the ￿rst
year of the slaughter and $3.27 in 1885 the last year. As shown, the NY hide
price series di⁄ers very little from the main WP series, and all conclusions of
the paper are una⁄ected by my choice of price index.
It is tempting of course to attribute the decline in hide prices to the
additional supply created by the bu⁄alo slaughter in the U.S. While in
theory the slaughter could have an e⁄ect on world prices, as an empirical
matter this is unlikely. The worldwide hide market was huge with yearly
30exports exceeding 100 million US dollars by 1880.40 The US share of this
market is always small during the relevant period ranging from a high of 3%
in 1860 to .5% in both 1880 and 1890. The U.S. was truly a small player in
the world hide market.
Finally, while the two or three dollar jump in the value of a bu⁄alo hide
in 1871 seems relatively small to have such large e⁄ects, it should be remem-
bered that a seasoned hunter could kill several thousand bu⁄alo a season.
Alternatively he could earn perhaps 50$/month as a cattle hand. Clearly
even at these relatively low hide prices, the rents to hide hunting were po-
tentially very large.
By using the WP hide price series shown in Table 1, I can now de￿ ate the
value of hide exports to obtain a volume of hide export series. This series
is shown in Figure 3 as the top most line with the large bulge centered on
1875. The line labelled Total Hides starts from a low of less than 100,000 in
1867, peaks at a little over 1.2 million in 1875, then declines until it reaches
200,000 in 1880. In the early 1880s, exports cycle back upwards only to fall
again in 1886. I will argue that the large bulge of exports in the mid 1870s
represents the destruction of the Southern Herd, while the smaller bulge in
the early 1880s corresponds to the destruction of the Northern Herd.
To eliminate cattle hides from the volume of hide export series I construct
a measure of cattle slaughtered in the U.S. using a well known economic
model of the cattle cycle. The U.S. Agricultural Department publishes data
from 1867 onwards on the number of cattle in the U.S. I have graphed this
data in Figure 3 as Cattle. Since the number of cattle in the U.S. in 1867 is
approximately 25 million and is over 55 million in the late 1880s, the slowly
rising line shown in the ￿gure is graphed against the alternate right hand
side axis which is measured in thousands of animals.
To move from cattle numbers to an estimate of the number of cattle hides
exported several steps are required.41 First, I employ estimates drawn from
Rosen, Scheinkman and Murphy, RSM, (1994) to generate an implied breed-
ing stock from the overall cattle numbers. This step is necessary because
not all cows are fertile, and not all cattle are cows. Using the implied breed-
ing stock I then employ RSM￿ s empirical estimates to generate an implied
yearly slaughter. RSM develop a dynamic forward looking model of cattle
40For information on the magnitude of the world hide market see John R. Hanson, Trade
in Transition: Exports from the Third World, 1840-1900, data sets are available online at
http://eh.net/databases/developing.
41See appendix B for further details.
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Cattle  Breeding Stock Cattle Slaughtersupply to study the cattle cycle in the U.S. and estimate their model on data
starting in 1867. By employing their estimates I have calculated both the
underlying breeding stock and the slaughter coming from the stock. The
implied breeding stock and slaughter numbers are shown in Figure 3 and
given their magnitudes both are graphed against the right hand side axis.
The ￿nal step in the identi￿cation of bu⁄alo hides in exports uses addi-
tional data from historical sources and makes one further assumption. His-
torical sources all agree that prior to 1870, there was no market in bu⁄alo
hides. Up to this point in time, bu⁄alo was hunted for its robe, its meat
or killed for amusement. Without knowledge of how to tan a bu⁄alo hide,
the hide market was non-existent. This implies that in 1870 U.S. exports
of hides could only be those of cattle. Under this assumption, I ￿nd that
only 1% of the hides from slaughtered cattle are being exported in 1870.
Similarly, historical accounts indicate that hunting on the northern plains
stopped sometime during the 1883-84 season; shipment of hides down the
Missouri by steamboat or via the Northern Paci￿c by rail may have ended
sometime later, and exports later still because of potential inventory e⁄ects.
Accordingly, I have assumed that in 1886, the export of hides must again
represent only cattle. By 1886, I now ￿nd that 1.7% of the hides from
slaughtered cattle are exported. Using these two points as anchors, I then
use a linear interpolation for the years in between. Doing so generates the
light colored line representing an estimate of that part of the existing U.S.
cattle slaughter that is exported. Subtracting the implied cattle hides from
the overall hide export numbers yields our estimate for the number of bu⁄alo
hides exported from 1870 to 1886.
4.2 Variation over time and regions
The method of data construction is fairly lengthy and detailed. Were it
not for the absolute paucity of other data on the number of bu⁄alo killed
or exported, and the existence of other con￿rming evidence that I shall now
present, there would be little to suggest its acceptance. The series as con-
structed however has several desirable characteristics that argue in its favor.
First, note that by construction the series reaches zero in 1870 and 1886
(the two "identi￿cation points"), but also exhibits a severe dip in hide exports
in 1880.42 1879 was the last year of the Southern hunt; and 1881 the ￿rst
42It is also worthwhile to note that even the unadjusted export series (with cattle hides
32signi￿cant year of the Northern hide hunt. It is therefore striking that our
constructed series exhibits a pause as hunters moved from south to north.
Further con￿rmation comes from other aspects of the series. Using the
series I calculate the implied number of bu⁄alo hides exported during the
entire 1871-1886 period. It sums to almost 6 million exported hides. Of the 6
million hides exported, 5 million hides come from what I am calling the 1870s
destruction of the Southern Herd, and only 1 million from the destruction
of the Northern Herd. This is consistent with the accounts of Hornaday
and many others indicating the Southern Herd was much larger than the
Northern. For example, Hornaday estimates a northern kill of only 1.5
million whereas Figure 1 generates a total close to 1 million. Therefore the
series generates a distribution across geographic region that roughly matches
the historical account.
The total of 5 million killed in the south is however higher than that given
in the estimates of Hornaday and Dodge, but both of these authors severely
downplayed the extent of the Southern Herd destruction that occurred post
1874. As shown by the series in Figure 3, while exports peaked in 1875 there
was still substantial hide exports well into the late 1870s. My own reading of
the historical accounts of bu⁄alo hunters (not available to either Hornaday or
Dodge) indicates that hide hunting of signi￿cant magnitude did occur post
1874. For example, Dodge reports that in the "last year" of the Southern
slaughter, 1874, the number of hides shipped by rail was only 126 thousand
falling from the peak of 750 thousand the year before. New evidence on
hide shipments I uncovered in the Annual reports of the New York Chamber
of Commerce is inconsistent with this view. For example, the Chamber
of Commerce report for 1875/76 states that 200 thousand bison hides were
shipped by rail to the port of New York alone in that year.43 This new data
from the Chamber of Commerce report strongly suggests the Southern Herd
was not destroyed by 1874 - a fact further corroborated by contemporary
news stories and numerous personal accounts of bu⁄alo hunters which make
included) takes a suspicious jump in the early 1870s exactly when the London Times article
dates the innovation and reports on a booming trade in hides. Had the series boomed in
1868 or 1875 this coincidence in timing would not be present.
43The Chamber of Commerce of New York 18th Annual Report for 1875/1876 contains
the throw away line "Included in the receipts by railroad are about 200,000 bison hides",
p. 115. Since rail was only one of many transportation routes, and New York only one
of several large export ports, it is reasonable to assume the total number of bison hides
reaching the international market was much higher.
33it clear that the Southern Herd was not destroyed until 1879.44
When considering the 1872-1874 period alone, my constructed series and
Dodge￿ s (constructed) numbers are much closer. For example, Dodge￿ s es-
timate of hide shipments over the 1872-1874 period is approximately 1.4
million hides; the implied shipment of hides for exports from Figure 3 is
somewhat higher at 1.7 million. Therefore, the magnitude of the Southern
Herd destruction, and its pace in the early years of the slaughter, roughly
match those available in the literature.
4.3 Across country and across hide variation
Further evidence is available if we exploit the variation across countries in
hide exports. Historical accounts of the hide trade reveal that two individuals
were critical in its progression. One was a Kansas city pelt trader called
J.N. Dubois. The standard historical account given by Gard (1960, p. 90)
appeared earlier in the paper. Another trader repeatedly mentioned in
early accounts was W.C. Lobenstein. Lobenstein was a well known trader
in leather products who sometime in late 1870 or early 1871 started to ￿ll
orders for hides to ship to England. Given these historical accounts it is
revealing to note that the geographic distribution of U.S. hide exports o⁄ers
two other pieces of con￿rming evidence.
U.S. export data show the value of hide exports to Germany being negli-
gible in the early 1860s, and then skyrocketing to over $100,000 in 1871-72,
rising further to over $500,000 in 1874, and then declining to $50,000 in
1880.45 It is striking that the sudden rise in exports of hides to Germany oc-
curs just when other historical accounts place J.N. DuBois at center stage in
44For e.g., the Fort Worth Democrat, Nov. 8, 1876, has a front page story titled
"Freighters Wanted. The Largest Bu⁄alo Hunt Ever Known". The story reports countless
thousands of bu⁄alo cover the prairies while the hunt is the largest ever known. Regarding
the end of the hunt see the Frontier Times article "The Last Bu⁄alo Hunt Held in the
Lone Star State", reprinted by the Dallas Morning News Aug. 9, 1925. The article dates
the last hunt to Nov. 1879.
45Prior to uni￿cation of Germany in 1870, these exports are to cities in the Hanseatic
league; speci￿cally Hamburg and Bremen. These towns disappear in the aggregate US
export data in 1870 and are replaced by Germany as an entry. City speci￿c export data
(from the port of NY) is available in the NY Chamber of Commerce Annual Reports,
and these data con￿rm that the Hanseatic cities are the leading destinations post 1870.
Therefore, a change in the de￿nition to German exports is unlikely to be responsible for
the blip in exports.
34the bu⁄alo hide trade. The English data is equally striking. In the post civil
war period, 1866-1870, U.S. hide exports to England averaged $50,000/year.
Starting in 1872 however these exports took o⁄ rising to over $2 million in
1873 and averaging over $1.3 million dollars per year for the next six years.
The sudden explosion in exports to England, together with the historical
accounts of Lobenstein￿ s activities provides further corroboration.
This evidence is however subject to critique. It may be inappropriate to
attribute all of the "explosion in exports to England", or the "sudden rise in
exports to Germany" to the impact of the innovation. Exports of hides to
Europe may have risen for many reasons. The 1870s was a very tumultuous
time in Europe with German uni￿cation in 1870, the Franco-Prussian war in
1871, and colonial expansion later in the decade. Perhaps the explosion in
U.S. hide exports to Europe re￿ ects a temporary European event and not the
availability of bu⁄alo hides from the U.S. One solution would be to examine
U.S. exports to other European countries that did not have the ability to
tan bu⁄alo hides. This however is not possible. The U.S. exported hides
to only a very few countries on a regular basis, and hence examining the
exports to say Belgium, the Netherlands, etc. is not feasible because exports
to these markets are both sporadic and small. Even if the data did exist,
what guarantee would we have that these European countries could not learn
from their neighbors in France, Germany, or the UK?
4.3.1 Ruling out a European Demand Shock
An alternative is to examine European data on hide imports from countries
other than the U.S. If a European speci￿c demand shock is driving U.S.
hide exports upwards for reasons unrelated to the availability of bu⁄alo, this
shock should show up in European imports from other countries as well. To
examine this possibility, I collected, where possible, hide import data from
European countries that were major destinations for U.S. hide exports. The
major destinations for U.S. hide exports were France, Germany, and the UK.
At present, I have collected this data from all countries except Germany.46
46For the France data see France, Direction gØnØral des douanes, Tableau gØnØral du
commerce de la France avec ses colonies et les puissance ØtrangŁres, published annually for
the years 1825-1895. For the UK data see Great Britain, Annual Statement of the Trade
and Navigation of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British Possessions,
for the years 1853-1870 and Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with
Foreign Countries and British Possessions for the years 1871-1924. I currently have some
35Using this data, I can examine how the share of hide imports coming from
the U.S. varies over time. The rationale for using imports shares is simple:
a uniform demand shock in Europe should raise its imports of hides from
all sources leaving the U.S. share unchanged; a U.S. speci￿c shock - such as
the availability of bu⁄alo hides - should however raise the share of imports
coming from the U.S. dramatically and temporarily.
This new data also allows for a further sharpening of the hypothesis. The
UK and French data allow me to divide their hide imports into tanned and
raw hide categories; this is very fortunate since the available U.S. export
data makes no such distinction.47 Since it is my contention that the bu⁄alo
hide exports to Europe were motivated by the inability of the U.S. domestic
industry to tan bu⁄alo hides, increased bu⁄alo hide exports coming from the
U.S. must come in the raw hide category.
In Table 2 below I present the results from a di⁄erence-in-means test
on the U.S. share of raw hide imports into the U.K and France. In light
of Figure 3, I divide the sample period into the period of Southern Herd
destruction, 1871-1879, and refer to this as the Southern Treatment Group
while the remaining period is captured in Other. I test the null of equality in
mean import shares across these two periods against the alternative that the
import share of raw hides was higher during the period the Southern Herd
was destroyed.
Table 2 - Di⁄erence in Means Test
Ho : mo ￿ m1 = 0
Ha : mo ￿ m1 < 0
Di⁄erence t P < t
France -5.02a -3.69 0.001
(1.36)
UK -3.39a -2.71 0.001
(1.25)
Notes: m1 is the mean of the Southern Treatment Group and mo is the mean of the
Other group. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, t is Student￿ s t-statistic, and P
German data but it is not up to the task as hides are grouped in with fur items, and
there is an incomplete record of imports across countries. I would like to thank Andy
Strangeman and Investra ltd. for their help in acquiring this data.
47The new data is useful in two other ways. The French data divides out skins from
hides and assures us that goat and deer skins were only 1-2% of total US hides and skins
exports to France. The French and U.K data also give hide imports in quantities.
36indicates probability values. The superscripts. a;indicates signi￿cance at the 0.01 level.
The dependent variable is the share of raw hide imports from the U.S. in total raw hide
imports from all countries.
The results are consistent with my earlier claims. The equality of means
is rejected at very high levels of signi￿cance. A ￿nding of equality of mean
import shares across these two periods would have suggested a European
speci￿c event raised raw hide imports from all countries and not just the
U.S.. The alternative is that there was an increase in the U.S. import share
over this period due to the availability of bu⁄alo.
4.3.2 Ruling out a U.S. Supply Shock
While the di⁄erence-in-means test argues against a European demand shock,
there still remains other explanations for the rise in raw hide exports from
the U.S. For example, a U.S. speci￿c event such as the completion of rail-
roads, the creation of an open range cattle industry, or the concentration of
production in large slaughterhouses could have raised U.S. hide exports.48
Perhaps the bulge in exports shown in Figure 3 represents a U.S. supply
shock unrelated to the bu⁄alo slaughter.
To investigate this possibility I exploit one more feature of the data and
our knowledge concerning the innovation. The only non-European country
receiving signi￿cant hide exports from the U.S. is Canada.49 Since there is
no evidence that the tanning industry in Canada was ever involved in the
commercial tanning of bu⁄alo hides, whereas the innovation was known in
various European countries, I treat the innovation in tanning as a quasi-
experiment with Canada as the control with no ability to tan bu⁄alo hides,
and the UK and France as treatment countries with the ability to tan.50
Canada is a reasonable but not perfect control: Canada was far less developed
48Any explanation along these lines does however have to explain why these U.S. speci￿c
events led to a temporary, and not permanent, rise in hide exports.
49For the Canadian data see Canada, General Statement of Exports, Sessional Papers
1860-1890.
50Canadian trade statistics do contain categories of exports tied to the bu⁄alo (bu⁄alo
hair was one such item), but despite this practice of speci￿cally labeling bu⁄alo products
there is no category for exported bu⁄alo hides from Canada. This is perhaps not surprising
because the Canadian bu⁄alo episode is quite di⁄erent from the American. In Canada,
trade in bu⁄alo robes was very important to depletion as was the associated hunting by
natives and Metis. As well, bu⁄alo were driven to extinction in Canada prior to the arrival
of connecting Canadian railways. All of this suggests no hide exports came from Canada,
37than France or the UK in the 1870s, and its distance from the U.S. market
is much smaller.
The UK and France are reliable treatment groups, if the assignment to
treatment is exogenous. The London Times article, discussed previously,
establishes that the timing of the innovation was exogenous to any charac-
teristic of France or the UK, since these countries were not the intended
market for the hides. The subsequent shipment of hides to the UK was
likely determined by the sheer economic might of the UK at the time, the
existence of other trading relations between the two nations, knowledge that
the UK tanning industry was advanced, or even a common language. Simi-
lar shipments, if they occurred, to Germany or France would be determined
by similar factors. It is di¢ cult to see why any of these factors - which
determined assignment to treatment - should play a role in determining the
over-time variation in the share of raw hide imports coming into these coun-
tries from the U.S. As a consequence, the assignment to treatment may
well provide the exogenous variation we need to identify bu⁄alo hides in the
data.
The innovation was a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition for exports.
The herds had to exist for exports to occur. I date the availability of the
innovation at 1871, and as before assume the Southern Herd was available
until 1879. The Northern Herd was available to hide hunters in the early
1880s, when the threat from the Sioux was eliminated, and was destroyed by
1886. The most general speci￿cation would allow for two treatment e⁄ects
(North and South), country speci￿c time trends and country dummies as
follows:




it + ￿it (11)
where sit is the U.S. share of raw hide imports in total raw hide imports
into country i = fCanada;France;UKg in year t from 1866 to 1887; ￿i is
a country speci￿c constant, and ￿it is a country speci￿c time trend. T S
it is
the treatment e⁄ect which takes on the value 1 during 1872-1879 and is zero
otherwise; T N
it takes on the value 1 from 1881 to 1886 and is zero otherwise.
Summary statistics for the import shares are presented in Table 3 below.
and hence the import of cow hides into Canada was determined by the same forces driving
demand for hides in Europe: a demand for leather for machinery, saddlery, and footwear.
38Table 3 - Summary Statistics
U.S. Share of Raw Hide Imports
Country Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. No.Obs.
Canada 91.5 93.1 6.6 70 97 22
France 2.9 1.7 3.3 .03 13.4 22
UK 3.4 1.6 3.9 .11 13.6 22
As expected, the U.S. share of raw hide imports into Canada is very
large at 91.5%. The reason is simply location: in the late 19th century
the world hide market was dominated by exports from Argentina and other
South American countries. These countries are distant from Canada but
along well established shipping routes to Europe. The median shares show
that France and the U.K relied on U.S. exports very little, while their average
shares exceed their medians because of exceptional shipments during the
Southern Herd slaughter. One noteworthy aspect of the Canadian data is
that the minimum import share was reached during the panic of 1873 when
bankruptcies disrupted shipments through Great Lake ports.
Table 4 presents the results from estimating, via OLS, various speci￿ca-
tions of 11. As we move left to right in the table more restricted versions of
11 are estimated.
39Table 4 - A Quasi Experiment
Dependent variable is sit I II III IV V
i = fCanada;France;UKg
France Intercept -.33 .24
(2.24) (1.83)
UK Intercept 1.24 .67
(2.24) (1.83)
Europe Intercept .46 .47 .60
(1.67) (1.46) (1.42)
Canada Intercept 91.12a 91.12a 91.12a 91.08a 90.73a





Europe Time .04 .03
(.15) (.15)




North Treatment 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.10
(2.51) (2.49) (2.47) (2.16)
South Treatment 4.80a 4.80a 4.80a 4.81a 4.38a
(1.71) (1.70) (1.68) (1.65) (1.41)
R2adjusted .99 .99 .99 .99 .99
RMSE 4.67 4.63 4.60 4.56 4.53
No:obs: 66 66 66 66 66
Notes: a;b;c: signi￿cant at 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 respectively.
Column I allows for country speci￿c time trends and intercepts, while
column II restricts the UK and France to a common European time trend.
Column III goes further to restrict both the intercept and time trend to be
common to Europe, while column IV imposes a common time trend across
all countries. Column V eliminates the Northern Treatment e⁄ect entirely.
It is apparent from the results in column I and II that we cannot distin-
guish between the constants for the UK and France, and hence from column
III forwards they are grouped together under Europe. This is no surprise
40given the reported medians in Table 3. The constant terms for Europe and
Canada are however signi￿cantly di⁄erent much as we would expect. There
is also little evidence of country speci￿c time trends. A common to Europe
trend is imposed in column II forward, while a common to all countries trend
is introduced in column IV. The regressions￿high level of ￿t comes from fea-
tures of the data. Most of the variation in the data is cross-country. Europe
and Canada di⁄er greatly in the share of imports from the U.S.; therefore,
the country speci￿c constants alone capture much of the variation. Despite
this feature, the estimates for both the Northern and Southern treatment are
always positive while the Southern treatment is always highly signi￿cant.
The relative and absolute magnitudes of the treatment e⁄ects also bear
scrutiny. The Southern treatment e⁄ect is estimated to be four to ￿ve times
larger than the Northern which is consistent with the historical accounts of
the slaughter by Hornaday and others. The magnitude of the Southern
treatment e⁄ect is estimated at 5% points. Since the estimated U.S. share
of imports into Europe, outside of the treatment period, is about .5%, the
Southern treatment estimate represents a very large ten fold increase.
One ￿nal means of evaluating these results is to employ them to construct
a measure of implied bu⁄alo hide shipments from the U.S. to the UK and
France. I calculate counterfactual imports into the UK and France under the
assumption that the innovation did not arrive in these countries. I employ
the estimates from column V and set the treatment e⁄ects to zero to obtain
a predicted import share for each country. Multiplying the predicted import
share by actual imports generates a counterfactual import quantity. Sub-
tracting counterfactual from actual imports gives an estimate of the implied
bu⁄alo hides imported by the UK and France. These are then graphed in
Figure 4.51
Figure 4 is striking. The implied bu⁄alo hide imports are predicted to
be either very small or negative until the early 1870s. This is as it should
51Two additional assumptions are made here. First, since U.K. and French imports
are in terms of weight, I have to translate hundredweights and kilograms of hides into
bu⁄alo hide numbers. I assume a hide weighs 28 lbs (then there are 4 in an English
hundredweight), which is a conservative estimate given my reading of the history. Second,
I have assumed the overall quantity of hide imports into the UK and France would have
remained the same absent the innovation. I think this is reasonable. Recall that the US
was only a small provider to these countries, their aggregate demand for hides was set by
a derived demand for leather which should be independent of the innovation, and the hide
market worldwide was huge and hence hide prices would not be a⁄ected by the absence
or presence of US bu⁄alo hides.
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UK Implied Buffalo Import
France Implied Buffalo Importbe since bu⁄alo hide imports must be zero prior to the innovation. Post
innovation, imports rise dramatically until 1875 only to fall again near to
zero in the late 1870s. The ￿gure shows what may be a small Northern
Herd impact in the early 1880s that falls o⁄ in 1886. It is interesting to
note that the UK series jumps upwards before that of France - consistent
with the UK being the original innovator and France the follower. Simply
adding the imported hides in 1875 shows the UK and France importing over 1
million bu⁄alo hides, which is consistent with the aggregate ￿gure presented
previously in Figure 1. Summing the hide imports over the entire period
(including the negative elements) yields imports to the UK and France of
more than 3.5 million bu⁄alo. If we gross these up by Dodge￿ s wastage
estimates, the implied kill would be larger still.
Overall, the examination of the across country and across hide variation
in the data supports my earlier conclusions. The increase in raw hide im-
ports from the U.S., during the time of the Southern Herd destruction, is a
European/U.S. speci￿c event. Hide imports into Canada did not rise as they
did in the UK and France.52Despite the fact that the data used is di⁄erent,
the method of identifying bu⁄alo hides is di⁄erent, and the variable under
study is di⁄erent (import shares of raw hides vs. export levels of all hides)
the results are remarkably similar. There is strong evidence that the tanning
innovation led to an unusual and temporary level of raw hide imports into
the UK and France, but not Canada. It appears that this surge did not
occur because of a broad based demand shock in Europe, nor because of a
supply shock to cattle production in the U.S.. While alternative explana-
tions for this data remain, the set of credible alternatives has been narrowed
considerably. In particular, I will now argue that none of the other leading
theories is consistent with the evidence presented.
5 Alternative Hypotheses
Amazon.com lists over 4000 book entries when bu⁄alo is entered as a search
term; a library of congress search generates the maximum of hits; and any
visit to your local bookseller will reveal several new books on bu⁄alo history,
biology, etc. printed in just the last few years. Given the importance of
the bu⁄alo to Native and Western history, and its role as a national sym-
52This is further corroborated by a di⁄erence-in-means test (identical to that presented
in Table 3) for Canada which cannot reject the null of identical means across periods.
42bol it should come as no surprise that there are numerous explanations for
the bu⁄alo￿ s demise. Research contains numerous book length treatments,
hundreds of scholarly articles and many theses and dissertations. It is not
possible here to develop in any detail a careful examination of all of the
competing hypotheses; instead I will discuss how key alternatives are largely
inconsistent with the data and arguments presented here.
5.1 The Army
Many accounts of the bu⁄alo slaughter contend that the elimination of the
bu⁄alo was a secret goal of government policy. Some authors go so far
as to label it genocide. The evidence provided for this hypothesis is the
many failed and stalled bills introduced in Congress, and various quotes from
government o¢ cials noting the salutary e⁄ect an extinction would have on
domiciling the natives. For example, a bill restricting the harvest of female
cows to only Indian hunters on all federal lands passed both the House and
the Senate in June of 1874, but was killed by a pocket veto by President
Grant. This result is not that surprising since Grant￿ s Secretary of the
Interior, Columbus Delano, was in favor of the destruction of the bu⁄alo.
He refused to stop hide hunters from entering Sioux lands, and in his report
for 1873 wrote "I would not seriously regret the total disappearance of the
bu⁄alo from our western prairies, in its e⁄ect upon the Indians. I would
regard it rather as a means of hastening their sense of dependence upon the
products of the soil and their own labors " Gard (1960, p. 207).
Other accounts coming from speeches made by General Sherman, Sheri-
dan or Custer are all similar in that these men thought the destruction of the
herds would have a bene￿cial e⁄ect in reducing Indian resistance.53 While
this aspect of the story is surely true, and while federal legislation may have
helped stem the tide of the slaughter, the regulatory problem was formi-
dable.54 The Great Plains is an incredibly large area that was only sparsely
53For example, General Sherman￿ s quote "I think it would be wise", he said of the Sioux
insistence on hunting on the Republican River, "to invite all the sportsmen of England
and America there this fall for a Grand Bu⁄alo hunt, and make one grand sweep of them
all", Utley (2003, p.166).
54The regulatory problem was well known. In 1866, a Harper￿ s Magazine writer com-
menting on the introduction of a bill to restrict bu⁄alo hunting noted that "The di¢ culty
will be to secure its enforcement, as the extermination of these animals, which is now
impending, is brought about by parties who, at a distance from any control, are a law
43populated in 1870. Over much of the relevant time period, the federal gov-
ernment already had its hands full managing Indian wars, economic crises,
and the progress of reconstruction after a bloody civil war. While the ab-
sence of federal regulation made the slaughter simple to conduct and legal,
it was the economic incentive created by the tanning innovation that fueled
the frenzy.
5.2 New Railroads and New Ri￿ es
Two other new technologies are often linked to the bu⁄alo slaughter: the
extension of railroads into bu⁄alo country, and the introduction of powerful
breech loading ri￿ es after the Civil War.
Various railroads promoted bu⁄alo hunting excursions to eastern dandies
and allowed shooting from rail cars. Sunday bu⁄alo hunting trips were adver-
tised quite widely in the press, and surely played some role in the slaughter.
However the natural growth rate of bu⁄alo is reasonable high (with an in-
trinsic rate of growth between .15 and .25), and this implies that localized
sport hunting along the tracks could never deplete the herds signi￿cantly.
Perhaps more importantly the railroads were a major transportation link in
the bu⁄alo hide trade. While it is surely true that hundreds of thousands
of hides were shipped along the western railroads it is di¢ cult to argue that
the extension of new railroads into bu⁄alo country caused the slaughter. For
example, the Union Paci￿c railroad arrived in the heart of bu⁄alo country
at Cheyenne Wyoming in 1867 a full 5 years before the Southern hide boom.
In the north, there is no gap in time between the completion of the Northern
Paci￿c￿ s line into Montana and the slaughter of the Northern Herd. In this
case, the arrival of the railroad would seem critical, but this is not entirely
clear. Prior to and after the railroad arrived, goods came and went by river
boat on the Missouri. While the railroad may have lowered transportation
costs, this region had other transportation options. It seems likely in fact
that the northern slaughter was delayed by the hostile Sioux Indians, and not
any lack of transportation. It was not until the early 1880s that the north-
ern bu⁄alo range was made safe for bu⁄alo hunters - and made safe for the
Northern Paci￿c to complete its construction into Montana. The Canadian
experience also tells us that railroads were not a necessary condition for the
unto themselves, and who are not likely to be in￿ uenced by any enactments that do not in-
volve the means of execution." Harper￿ s Magazine, April 15th, 1866, Scienti￿c Intelligence
section.
44extermination, since bu⁄alo were exterminated in Canada before the arrival
of western railways.
A similar argument applies to the new powerful breech loading ri￿ es in-
troduced after the Civil war. The new ri￿ es by Remington, Sharps and
Spring￿eld greatly facilitated the slaughter, but it is di¢ cult to argue they
were pivotal. For example, breech loading ri￿ es such as the infantry issue
Spring￿eld .50 calibre were in existence years before the slaughter occurred,
while perhaps the most popular bu⁄alo gun, the Sharp￿ s Big 50, was not
introduced until after the slaughter was already three years underway (in
1874).
Therefore, while the existence of the new railroad lines into southern
Kansas, northern Texas and Montana surely facilitated the slaughter, as did
the availability of more and better ri￿ es, it is di¢ cult to argue they were
necessary for the slaughter.
5.3 Environmental Change & Native Overhunting
A ￿nal explanation for the slaughter is environmental change and drought
coupled with native over hunting.55 The Great Plains experienced a very
wet period up to the early 1850s and had a series of serious droughts in
the subsequent 30 years. Some authors contend that these environmental
changes weakened the bu⁄alo and reduced their numbers considerably prior
to 1870. If we add to this stress native overhunting, created by the robe
market and the breakdown of societal norms within the Indian community,
it is possible to argue in favor of a much smaller bu⁄alo number prior to the
hide hunters.
The evidence presented earlier is largely at odds with this explanation.
The bu⁄alo slaughter was large and not small, and it was primarily propa-
gated by white hide hunters. While it is virtually impossible to prove the
herds were not larger in 1850 than at the start of hide hunting in the 1870s,
it is clear that the slaughter during the 1870s and 1880s was spectacular in
its magnitude. Environmental change may have contributed to an overall
lessening of bu⁄alo numbers, but had it not occurred I suspect hide hunting
would have just lasted longer. Long term change in the West￿ s environ-
ment did not kill the bu⁄alo - it was the simple pro￿t motive created by
technological change and maintained by robust export markets.
55Isenberg (2000) is the leading proponent of this view.
456 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the slaughter of the plains bu⁄alo
in the 19th century using a combination of theory, empirics and ￿rst hand
accounts of bu⁄alo hunters. I have presented an explanation for the slaughter
that is not conventional. While hide hunting, the U.S. Army, native over
hunting and the Railroads are typically held responsible for the slaughter,
the role of international trade has featured minimally if at all. Instead,
I have argued that free trade in bu⁄alo hides was critical to the explosion
of activity on the plains in the 1870s. By employing insights from theory,
I have pieced together statistical evidence from numerous countries, diary
and newspaper accounts, and logic to present a largely circumstantial, but
hopefully compelling case that the plains bu⁄alo was not eliminated by the
usual suspects - it was instead the victim of global markets and technological
progress.
The introduction to this paper claimed that (1) a price for bu⁄alo prod-
ucts that was largely invariant to changes in supply; (2) open access condi-
tions with no regulation of the bu⁄alo kill; and (3), a newly invented tanning
process that made bu⁄alo hides into valuable commercial leather were jointly
necessary and su¢ cient for the slaughter on the Great Plains. The theo-
retical results demonstrate that the combination of a tanning innovation,
open access to bu⁄alo hunting, and ￿xed world prices delivers a punctuated
slaughter that matches that witnessed on the Great Plains. I take this as
proof of su¢ ciency.
I have also demonstrated that the slaughter can only be generated when
demand is very elastic. This establishes the necessity of a market price that is
"largely invariant" to changes in supply. The tanning innovation was proven
to be necessary by the absence of the slaughter during the ￿ve years prior
to 1872 when the Union Paci￿c had reached the heart of bu⁄alo country.
And the necessity of open access for the slaughter is proven by numerous
private parties who found bu⁄alo to be such a valuable resource that they
established property rights on their own by capturing and then breeding live
bu⁄alo. Several entrepreneurial ranchers in the 1870s and 1880s established
private herds that, until federal legislation arrived in the mid 1890s, probably
saved the bu⁄alo from extinction.
It is somewhat ironic, that what must be the saddest chapter in U.S.
environmental history was not written by Americans; it was instead, the work
of Europeans. Europe in the 19th century was the high income developed
46region, while America was a young developing country recently rocked by a
bloody civil war caused by racial strife. In the 1870s, America was a large
resource exporter with little or no environmental regulation while Europe was
a high income consumer of U.S. resource products apparently indi⁄erent to
the impact their consumption had on America￿ s natural resources. Written
in this way it is apparent that the story of the bu⁄alo has as much relevance
today as it did 130 years ago. Many developing countries in the world
today are heavily reliant on resource exports, are struggling with active or
recently past civil wars fueled by racial strife, and few, if any, have stringent
regulations governing resource use. The slaughter on the plains tells us
that waiting for development to foster better environmental protection can
be a risky proposition: in just a few short years, international markets and
demand from high income countries can destroy resources that otherwise
would have taken centuries to deplete.
477 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Proofs
Proposition 1. Suppose not. Let both S1 6= S2 solve K(p;S) = G(S).
Let S1 < S2, then G(S1)=S1 > G(S2)=S2 by the strict concavity of G.
Since K(p;S1) = G(S1) and K(p;S2) = G(S2) by assumption, we must





















￿f(￿)d￿ implies 0 > N
￿￿1 R
￿2￿
￿f(￿)d￿ which is a contradiction. The
uniqueness of ￿￿ follows directly as does the unique division of labor across
sectors.
Proposition 2. Under the conditions necessary for Proposition 1, Figure
1 depicts the determination of a unique steady state. By inspection
￿
S < 0
for S above S￿, and
￿
S > 0 for S positive but below S￿.





rises with p on impact. Di⁄erentiating K(p;S) w.r.t. p establishes Kp =
￿￿￿NSf(￿￿)[d￿￿=dp] > 0: ii)
￿
S < 0 for S above S￿0;d￿￿=dt = ￿[w=[pS2]]
￿
S
> 0 for S above S￿0; and, dK=dt = Ks
￿
S < 0 for S above S￿0. iii) Dif-
ferentiating K(p;S￿) = G(S￿), yields dS￿=dp = [Kp=[G0 ￿ KS]]: This is
negative because we know G(S) is cut from below at S￿ by K(p;S) and
hence [G0 ￿ KS] < 0.
Lemma 1. The number of bu⁄alo hunters is [1 ￿ F(￿￿)]N, where ￿￿ is
given by 1 and hence is a function of both p and S. If ￿￿ rises (stays constant,
falls) hunter numbers fall (stay constant, rise). In autarky p is determined
by S at every moment in time by market clearing. To prove the result, note
from 1 that the elasticity of ￿￿ with respect to S and p are equal at ￿1. To





and hence by inspection RS falls with ￿￿. This implies RS(p;S) is increasing
in both S and p and establishes that their partial elasticities must be positive
48"rs;p > 0;"rs;s > 0. Di⁄erentiating RS shows "rs;s = 1+"rs;p > 0. Using this
information di⁄erentiate the market clearing condition 9 to ￿nd 10. Finally,
di⁄erentiating 1 and using 10 yields [d￿￿=dS][S=￿￿] = [
1+"rs;p
￿+"rs;p ￿1]. Therefore
when ￿ is greater (equal to, less) than one, ￿￿ falls (stays constant, rises)
with herd size, and bu⁄alo hunter numbers rise (stay constant, fall) with
herd size.
Lemma 2. Di⁄erentiating 9 with respect to ￿ holding S constant yields
[dpe=d￿][￿=pe] = [ 1
￿+"rs;p] > 0.
Proposition 4. Steady state is de￿ned by G(S￿) = K(￿￿;S￿), where
￿￿ = m(pe;S￿) is given by 1, and pe = g(￿;S￿) is given by 9. Substitute
for equilibrium prices and the marginal hunter in the steady state condition.
Di⁄erentiate with respect to ￿ to ￿nd: dS=d￿ = [K￿mpg￿]=[G0 ￿ dK
dS ]where
subscripts denote partial derivatives. We have already established K￿ < 0
and mp < 0: Lemma 2 established g￿ > 0. Therefore the numerator of
dS=d￿ is positive. Local stability of any steady state requires
￿
S < 0 for
S above S￿, and
￿




dS ] < 0, where dK
dS is a total derivative taking into account price
adjustment in autarky. Requiring local stability signs dS=d￿ < 0.
7.2 Appendix B: Data
7.2.1 Hide Prices
There are a variety of sources for hide prices. Information on prices is
important for three reasons. First, in some cases I need to de￿ ate export
values to obtain quantities so it is important that the prices be right in order
for the quantities to be right. Second, if there was a huge change in hide
prices during the period this may suggest alternative hypotheses that are
not considered here. Third, it would be useful to know how much bu⁄alo
hunters obtained for their e⁄orts in order to understand just how pro￿table
hunting may have been.
Prices used to de￿ ate values were obtained from several sources to ensure
that no one source could be responsible for the results. The primary source
for hide prices is the limited number of hide prices given in Foreign Commerce
and Navigation ￿gures for hides and skins exports. To construct the price
index for hides I employ price per hide data from 1864, 1865 and 1866. Price
49per hide is found by dividing that year￿ s export revenue by the number of
hides exported. I then take a simple average of these three years, and employ
the leather and leather goods price index of Warren and Pearson to generate
an estimated price per hide for 1865 to 1886. I employ exactly the same
method when I use the price series drawn from the Annual Reports of the
New York Chamber of Commerce.
7.2.2 Hide Exports
I assume the number of cattle hides produced is equal to the annual slaughter
of U.S. cattle. To calculate the slaughter over the 1870-1886 period, I proceed
in two steps. In step one, I calculate the breeding stock of cattle. I follow
Rosen, Murphy and Scheinkman (1994) by relating the total head count y(t)
of all cattle to current and past values of the breeding stock x(t). The
total stock of cattle is equal to this year￿ s breeding stock x(t), plus last years
calves, gx(t ￿ 1) plus yearlings that have yet to be slaughtered gx(t ￿ 2).
That is:
y(t) = x(t) + gx(t ￿ 1) + gx(t ￿ 2) (12)
where g is the natural growth rate set equal to .85. The U.S. data for
y(t) starts in 1867. Since 1867 is close to the period of time we are most
interested in, I follow RMS by initializing the series employing the historical
growth rate of the cattle population and making a steady state assumption.
In particular, set
x(1867) = y(1867)=[1 + (g=1:045) + (g=1:045)
2] (13)
x(1868) = 1:045x(1867) (14)
where the ￿rst equation follows from the steady state version of 12. g is
given by the average annual growth rate of the U.S. cattle population over
the 1875-1990 period which is approximately 4.5 %. The second equation
also re￿ ects a steady state assumption. By using the initial breeding stock
￿gures for 1867 and 1868, it is now straightforward to manipulate 12 to solve
for x(1869) and all subsequent years using data on the series y(t) alone.
To calculate the implied slaughter of cows I employ the empirical esti-
mates RMS obtain when they run the following regression over the 1900-1990
period.
x(t) + c(t) = b0 + b1x(t ￿ 1) + b2x(t ￿ 2) + b3x(t ￿ 3) + ut (15)
50where x(t) is the breeding stock RMS generate when they assume g = :85
and c(t) is the actual slaughter ￿gure (only available from 1900 onwards).
The addition of these two ￿gures is then regressed on the lagged breeding
stock plus a constant. I employ RMS￿ s estimates of bi from their Table 1,
and by rearranging obtain an implied slaughter:
c(t) = ￿1;524 + 1:01x(t ￿ 1) + :09x(t ￿ 2) + :92x(t ￿ 3) ￿ x(t) (16)
With the implied slaughter ￿gures in hand I employ my three identifying
assumptions. One, I assume hide exports in 1870 can only be from cattle;
therefore, h(1870) = f(1870)c(1870) where f(t) is the fraction of total cattle
hides exported in year t. Two, I assume the same is true for 1886, hence
h(1886) = f(1886)c(1886). And three, for any year between these two points
I employ a linear interpolation for f; that is
f(t
0) = f(t





The exported slaughter h(t) is approximately 1% of the total slaughter
in 1870 c(t), but rises to 1.7% in 1886. Therefore, these estimates imply the
vast majority of hides coming from the U.S. cattle slaughter are used in the
U.S. This seems reasonable since the U.S. was a large importer of hides over
this period.
The estimate for bu⁄alo hides exported is calculated as:
bh(t) = th(t) ￿ h(t) (19)
where th(t) is the total export number for hides calculated from U.S.
trade statistics, bh(t) is the estimated bu⁄alo hides exported as shown in
Figure 2, and h(t) is the estimated cattle hide exports calculated using the
procedure above.
An alternate procedure is to assume exports of cow hides are proportional
to total domestically available hides which would include the U.S. slaughter
plus imports into the U.S. market. US import data is available, and using
the Warren and Pearson index we can again obtain hide numbers from the
value estimates. Then again using 1870 and 1886 as points of identi￿cation,
we ￿nd that exports as a function of total domestic availability is .7% in
1870 rising to 1.1% in 1886. Employing a linear interpolation between these
51years we can again construct implied cow hide exports and then bu⁄alo hide
exports. This alternative series is very similar to the one presented in the
text (for eg. the total Southern hides exported is 5.15 million from 1871-1879,
while the total Northern Herd exports equals .85 million from 1881-1885).
The reason the two series are similar is that imports are only a fraction
of the US domestic slaughter and imports are relatively smooth over this
time period. This further check is useful. Although the export series we
employ contains only exports from domestic production (and not imports),
it is possible that a perfectly timed import surge of cow hides could have
met domestic US demand therefore freeing up domestically produced hides
to create the aberration in exports we are associating with the bu⁄alo. This
alternative procedure demonstrates that including variation in hide imports
into our calculations cannot generate the boom in hide exports.
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